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The Staff of SOH
'EasyEd, Here's Your Answer...'
- Thread starter Panther_99FS
- Start date
N2056
Charter Member
Here's a recording of the ATC transmissions between the plane ("shooter 25") and Socal Tracon...
http://media.nbcsandiego.com/audio/sandiego_f18.mp3
Fast forward to the 8:00 point. I'm still listening to it here...
http://media.nbcsandiego.com/audio/sandiego_f18.mp3
Fast forward to the 8:00 point. I'm still listening to it here...
Hey All,
It don't help much...
If you recall I said the whole situation looked and smelled of bad decision-making from the start. But at least the process appears to be working. That is good.
I assume there will be a more thorough followup report available somewhere.
Semper fi
-Ed-
It don't help much...
If you recall I said the whole situation looked and smelled of bad decision-making from the start. But at least the process appears to be working. That is good.
I assume there will be a more thorough followup report available somewhere.
Semper fi
-Ed-
Panther_99FS
Retired SOH Administrator
Hmmm.
My recollection was that you wanted 100% of the blame to be placed on the pilot...
I could be wrong though...
And it *appears* to me that your doubts about the system working fairly have now been squelched...
My recollection was that you wanted 100% of the blame to be placed on the pilot...
I could be wrong though...
And it *appears* to me that your doubts about the system working fairly have now been squelched...
Hey All,
As I recall the PIC has the final say.
I never doubted he was getting advice but he clearly didn't listen to aircraft carrier advice to land at north island and probably got bad advice from Mira Mar to try to get the jet home and made the wrong decision. The desire to "complete the mission" in the face of bad weather or an ailing plane commonly gets people killed. Fortunately the pilot of an Airbus who landed a plane in the Hudson understood that and aborted Teterboro.
This sentence says it well
I never doubted that this would result in a public investigation. You don't kill 3 people in San Diego with an FA-18 and avoid that. My faith in the system has been largely restored - but let's see where it ends up.
-Ed-
As I recall the PIC has the final say.
I never doubted he was getting advice but he clearly didn't listen to aircraft carrier advice to land at north island and probably got bad advice from Mira Mar to try to get the jet home and made the wrong decision. The desire to "complete the mission" in the face of bad weather or an ailing plane commonly gets people killed. Fortunately the pilot of an Airbus who landed a plane in the Hudson understood that and aborted Teterboro.
This sentence says it well
So Major General Alles said so too. At the end of the day it is the pilots decision, his responsibility and his conscience.
I never doubted that this would result in a public investigation. You don't kill 3 people in San Diego with an FA-18 and avoid that. My faith in the system has been largely restored - but let's see where it ends up.
-Ed-
T
tigisfat
Guest
It never ceases to amaze me that every decision I make as a pilot is a crucial one to both life and property, and they must be made in a timely manner. The only thing you can do is prepare by reading, training and staying in the right mindset. I've only been tested a few times with stupid things..like electrical failures while IFR, and I've done alright so far...but there's always that fear that I won't react properly and make the right decisions when it really comes down to it.
In the end there will always be that fear. If you fly (I don't care if its for a living or for pleasure) you are operating in an environment that will not tolerate egos, luck, or foolish chances. The freedom of flight is great, but so are the responsibilities, as are the consequences if we lets egos, luck, or foolish chances in to the equation.
If we are smart enough and pay attention we as human beings learn in two basic ways. We either learn from other people's experiences, or we learn from our own.
Panther_99FS
Retired SOH Administrator
EasyEd
I'm curious now...Since you continously state that you have doubts & that you're somewhat satisfied....
What end/final result would make you 100% satisfied?
And finally, you've been strangley silent o the Turkish 737 crash, what's your take on that?
I'm curious now...Since you continously state that you have doubts & that you're somewhat satisfied....
What end/final result would make you 100% satisfied?
And finally, you've been strangley silent o the Turkish 737 crash, what's your take on that?
Wing_Z
Charter Member 2011
Message from Boeing to all B737 operators: Fly the Airplane
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reference /A/ provides Boeing's previous fleet communication on the subject
event. The US NTSB, FAA, Boeing, the Turkish DGCA, the operator, the UK
AAIB, and the French BEA continue to actively support the Dutch Safety
Board's (DSB) investigation of this accident.
The DSB has released a statement on the progress of the investigation and
has approved the release of the following information.
While the complex investigation is just beginning, certain facts have
emerged from work completed thus far:
- To date, no evidence has been found of bird strike, engine or
airframe icing, wake turbulence or windshear.
- There was adequate fuel on board the aeroplane during the entire
flight.
- Both engines responded normally to throttle inputs during the entire
flight.
- The aeroplane responded normally to flight control inputs throughout
the flight.
The Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) data indicates that the crew was
using autopilot B and the autothrottle for an ILS (Instrument Landing
System) approach to runway 18R at Amsterdam Schiphol airport. During the
approach, the right Low Range Radio Altimeter (LRRA) was providing accurate
data and the left LRRA was providing an erroneous reading of -7 to -8 feet.
When descending through approximately 2000 feet the autothrottle, which uses
the left radio altimeter data, transitioned to landing flare mode and
retarded the throttles to the idle stop. The throttles remained at the idle
stop for approximately 100 seconds during which time the airspeed decreased to approximately 40 knots below the selected approach speed.
The two LRRA systems provide height above ground readings to several
aircraft systems including the instrument displays, autothrottle, autopilots
and configuration/ground proximity warning. If one LRRA provides erroneous
altitude readings, typical flight deck effects, which require flight crew
intervention whether or not accompanied by an LRRA fault flag, include:
- Large differences between displayed radio altitudes, including radio
altitude readings of -8 feet in flight.
- Inability to engage both autopilots in dual channel APP (Approach)
mode
- Unexpected removal of the Flight Director Command Bars during
approach
- Unexpected Configuration Warnings during approach, go-around and
initial climb after takeoff
- Premature FMA (Flight Mode Annunciation) indicating autothrottle
RETARD mode during approach phase with the aeroplane above 27 feet AGL. There
will also be corresponding throttle movement towards the idle stop.
Additionally, the FMA will continue to indicate RETARD after the throttles
have reached the idle stop
Boeing Recommended Action
- Boeing recommends operators inform flight crews of the above
investigation details and the DSB interim report when it is released. In
addition, crews should be reminded to carefully monitor primary flight
instruments (airspeed, attitude etc.) and the FMA for autoflight modes.
More information can be found in the Boeing 737 Flight Crew Training Manual
and Flight Crew Operations Manual.
Operators who experience any of the flight deck effects described above
should consult the troubleshooting instructions contained in the 737
aeroplane Maintenance Manual. Further, 737-NG operators may wish to review
737NG-FTD-34-09001 which provides information specific for the 737-NG
installation. Initial investigations suggest that a similar sequence of
events and flight deck indications are theoretically possible on the
737-100/-200/-300/-400/-500. Consequently the above recommendations also
apply to earlier 737 models.
Operators will be notified if further action is recommended . <!--IBF.ATTACHMENT_8239379-->
<!-- THE POST -->
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reference /A/ provides Boeing's previous fleet communication on the subject
event. The US NTSB, FAA, Boeing, the Turkish DGCA, the operator, the UK
AAIB, and the French BEA continue to actively support the Dutch Safety
Board's (DSB) investigation of this accident.
The DSB has released a statement on the progress of the investigation and
has approved the release of the following information.
While the complex investigation is just beginning, certain facts have
emerged from work completed thus far:
- To date, no evidence has been found of bird strike, engine or
airframe icing, wake turbulence or windshear.
- There was adequate fuel on board the aeroplane during the entire
flight.
- Both engines responded normally to throttle inputs during the entire
flight.
- The aeroplane responded normally to flight control inputs throughout
the flight.
The Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) data indicates that the crew was
using autopilot B and the autothrottle for an ILS (Instrument Landing
System) approach to runway 18R at Amsterdam Schiphol airport. During the
approach, the right Low Range Radio Altimeter (LRRA) was providing accurate
data and the left LRRA was providing an erroneous reading of -7 to -8 feet.
When descending through approximately 2000 feet the autothrottle, which uses
the left radio altimeter data, transitioned to landing flare mode and
retarded the throttles to the idle stop. The throttles remained at the idle
stop for approximately 100 seconds during which time the airspeed decreased to approximately 40 knots below the selected approach speed.
The two LRRA systems provide height above ground readings to several
aircraft systems including the instrument displays, autothrottle, autopilots
and configuration/ground proximity warning. If one LRRA provides erroneous
altitude readings, typical flight deck effects, which require flight crew
intervention whether or not accompanied by an LRRA fault flag, include:
- Large differences between displayed radio altitudes, including radio
altitude readings of -8 feet in flight.
- Inability to engage both autopilots in dual channel APP (Approach)
mode
- Unexpected removal of the Flight Director Command Bars during
approach
- Unexpected Configuration Warnings during approach, go-around and
initial climb after takeoff
- Premature FMA (Flight Mode Annunciation) indicating autothrottle
RETARD mode during approach phase with the aeroplane above 27 feet AGL. There
will also be corresponding throttle movement towards the idle stop.
Additionally, the FMA will continue to indicate RETARD after the throttles
have reached the idle stop
Boeing Recommended Action
- Boeing recommends operators inform flight crews of the above
investigation details and the DSB interim report when it is released. In
addition, crews should be reminded to carefully monitor primary flight
instruments (airspeed, attitude etc.) and the FMA for autoflight modes.
More information can be found in the Boeing 737 Flight Crew Training Manual
and Flight Crew Operations Manual.
Operators who experience any of the flight deck effects described above
should consult the troubleshooting instructions contained in the 737
aeroplane Maintenance Manual. Further, 737-NG operators may wish to review
737NG-FTD-34-09001 which provides information specific for the 737-NG
installation. Initial investigations suggest that a similar sequence of
events and flight deck indications are theoretically possible on the
737-100/-200/-300/-400/-500. Consequently the above recommendations also
apply to earlier 737 models.
Operators will be notified if further action is recommended . <!--IBF.ATTACHMENT_8239379-->
<!-- THE POST -->
Hey All,
Panther I have expressed doubts about the wisdom of flying an FA-18 on one engine over a crowded San Diego suburb. That was a very bad decision - one that astonished me then and still does. The Major General has also so indicated and as a result some people are in trouble over it - as well they should be - especially since the state of repair the jet was in was indicated. The review is ongoing we'll see what comes out of it.
I'm not the judge nor am I the jury. I have no expected outcome. I'm simply waiting to see where this goes and then I will be able to express an opinion on it's adequacy. Suffice to say no endpoint brings 3 people back to life.
As for the 737 crash I've not followed it. The previous post hints at some stuff - like the flight crew really may not have known the aircraft well enough but we really don't yet know all the facts.
-Ed-
PS Welcome back!
Panther I have expressed doubts about the wisdom of flying an FA-18 on one engine over a crowded San Diego suburb. That was a very bad decision - one that astonished me then and still does. The Major General has also so indicated and as a result some people are in trouble over it - as well they should be - especially since the state of repair the jet was in was indicated. The review is ongoing we'll see what comes out of it.
I'm not the judge nor am I the jury. I have no expected outcome. I'm simply waiting to see where this goes and then I will be able to express an opinion on it's adequacy. Suffice to say no endpoint brings 3 people back to life.
As for the 737 crash I've not followed it. The previous post hints at some stuff - like the flight crew really may not have known the aircraft well enough but we really don't yet know all the facts.
-Ed-
PS Welcome back!
srgalahad
Charter Member 2022
When a Turkish Airlines 737-800 crashed short of the runway in Amsterdam last week, killing nine people, it was one of those relatively rare accidents where no apparent cause was readily discernible. But on Wednesday, Dutch Safety Board investigators said a faulty radio altimeter fed misinformation to the autopilot. The altimeter registered that the airplane was approaching ground level when in fact it was still at 1,950 feet. The autopilot initiated a power-down of the engines in preparation for landing and the airplane slowed to near stall speed. The pilots responded to the situation too late, and the airplane hit the ground. The 737 data recorder showed that problems with the altimeter had occurred twice before, investigators said.
Boeing has issued a statement to 737 operators reminding pilots to carefully monitor instruments during critical phases of flight. The Dutch Safety Board said in its report that it is "of the opinion that extra attention is needed for the role of the radio altimeter when using the automatic pilot and the automatic throttle system." The board asked Boeing to pay extra attention to a part of a manual for the Boeing 737 in which is stated that in case of malfunction of the radio altimeter(s), the automatic pilot and throttle system that are connected to it may not be used for approach and landing. The board would like Boeing to consider an investigation into whether this procedure is also applicable during other phases of flight.
http://www.avweb.com/avwebflash/news/FaultyAltimeterDownedBoeing737InvestigatorsSay_199905-1.html
Boeing has issued a statement to 737 operators reminding pilots to carefully monitor instruments during critical phases of flight. The Dutch Safety Board said in its report that it is "of the opinion that extra attention is needed for the role of the radio altimeter when using the automatic pilot and the automatic throttle system." The board asked Boeing to pay extra attention to a part of a manual for the Boeing 737 in which is stated that in case of malfunction of the radio altimeter(s), the automatic pilot and throttle system that are connected to it may not be used for approach and landing. The board would like Boeing to consider an investigation into whether this procedure is also applicable during other phases of flight.
http://www.avweb.com/avwebflash/news/FaultyAltimeterDownedBoeing737InvestigatorsSay_199905-1.html
Hey All,
SrG I guess the key question is - what warning do the pilots have in the cockpit that all is not well other than looking out the window? If the plane slows too much isn't it already probably too late - I could see this happening as the crew might be expecting touchdown at any moment and allow it to get too slow. What system is in place? Is there an audible or visual warning if the two RAs don't agree? If not - WOW! Could it be that people still have to actually fly the plane despite all the wonders of technology? And if it's a dark bad vis approach what then?
-Ed-
SrG I guess the key question is - what warning do the pilots have in the cockpit that all is not well other than looking out the window? If the plane slows too much isn't it already probably too late - I could see this happening as the crew might be expecting touchdown at any moment and allow it to get too slow. What system is in place? Is there an audible or visual warning if the two RAs don't agree? If not - WOW! Could it be that people still have to actually fly the plane despite all the wonders of technology? And if it's a dark bad vis approach what then?
-Ed-
Wing_Z
Charter Member 2011
The Turkish 737 crash is one of the best indicators that the worst possible system design is one that requires human intervention on systems failure.
Especially in a mostly-automated environment.
Pilots are a dying breed: in future they will fly only high-risk missions such as ferrying nukes.
I believe this was the first year that the US Air Force spent more on UAV's than manned aircraft.
Especially in a mostly-automated environment.
Pilots are a dying breed: in future they will fly only high-risk missions such as ferrying nukes.
I believe this was the first year that the US Air Force spent more on UAV's than manned aircraft.
Meshman
Charter Member
If I could politely correct you, there were four deceased from that crash.
srgalahad
Charter Member 2022
I'd venture a guess that correctly cross-referencing the RA with the altimeter and an approach chart with the MDA/Airport Elevation might have some mitigating effect... and used to be part of the cockpit descent briefing.
See the Boeing memo posted above by Wing_Z... but they ARE "if system fails, human intervenes" responses which to me is the cart before the horse...
Just look at a large percentage of MSFS pilots and you can see how technology is the replacement for skills.. you TOO can fly a 747 on your first day
Having said that, commercial/ATR pilots are good, and well-trained, but they are human and can be lulled into trusting technology just like anyone else.
Rob
Boeing 737-200
My experience with the 737 was on the Zip and Canadian North -200s which only had 1 Radio Altimeter and no Autothrottle system. Putting the Radio Altimeter U/S also made the Autopilot, the GPWS, and the TCAS inop. If I remember properly I think we also had to contact the Chief Pilot for the fleet to get an OK to release the aircraft. The crew would whine mightily as I guess handflying the old stoneboat isn't that much fun. No time to read the Financial News:kiss:, just kidding.
Regards, Rob:ernae:
My experience with the 737 was on the Zip and Canadian North -200s which only had 1 Radio Altimeter and no Autothrottle system. Putting the Radio Altimeter U/S also made the Autopilot, the GPWS, and the TCAS inop. If I remember properly I think we also had to contact the Chief Pilot for the fleet to get an OK to release the aircraft. The crew would whine mightily as I guess handflying the old stoneboat isn't that much fun. No time to read the Financial News:kiss:, just kidding.
Regards, Rob:ernae:
T
tigisfat
Guest
I can't disprove you decisively, but I highly doubt that's true. Do you have any idea how much one B-1 flight costs? The maintenance and operating costs of augmented-thrust having 20-40 year old aircraft is magnitudes beyond that of a UAV---and the air force still has more manned aircraft.