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Wildcat vs Zero

Hi Shadow Wolf 07,

I believe you are sort of right. Consider the implications of a CAP that has no communications with the ships below or any friendlies in the air. From what I have read about Midway, the SBDs had a free run because ALL of the CAP was drawn to sea level to take out torpedo bombers. Kinda hard to coordinate defence or warn your side when you don't have a radio.

Consider what might have happened if the SBDs had arrived before the TBDs and encountered a CAP waiting for them. Perhaps it would have taken another year before a critical battle changed the course of the war?

As everyone keeps repeating, the quality of the pilot is much more important than minor differences in performance. Note that Pug Southerland was seriously embarrassing a couple Zeros until Saburo Sakai came along to end the party.

- Ivan.
 
The statistic quoted was not for just one battle, but for the period covering the entire first half of 1942 including the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway. Lundstrom uses Japanese records and does not relie on pilots claims for his figures. The zero never achieved air superiority over Guadalcanal for any sustained time. As a rule the Wildcats were able to inflict significant damage on the bomber formations and to control the skies during the day.
 
On Aug 20 1942 19 F4Fs from VMF 223 and 12 SBDs VMSB 232 landed at Cactus. On the 21st 4 F4Fs made contact with with IJN Zeros with Maj Smith getting one claimed kill. Later after the war it was found out that this zero was shot up bad but made it home. Durring this fight we had no one shot down or injured but did have three badly shot up planes and one that wold never fly again. We at that time had no raidar but did have a great coast watcher systum set up. Because of this inorder to save on gass it was decided not to fly any CAP missions on a regular bases. Another thing that played a facter at Guadalcanal was the weather and the condition of the field.The next contact with the enemy came on the 24th of Aug durring the battle of the Easter Solomans. The IJN forces lost several bombers and one zero durring the battle over cactus. From then on about noon almost every day the enemy would scend bettys escorted by zeros over to bomb Cactus.The rule for the US fighters was go after the bombers and leave the fighters alone. Make one diving pass pull out and if the enemy escorts were not in the way hit the bombers again. If the enemy fighters were in the way after the 1st pass head for a cloud and then home. Most of the time after an attack the US fighters came in one and two at a time. When the aleart was sounded it was 1st come 1st serve.They formed up later as they climbed up to attack alt. After the 1st pass most of the US planes lost there wingman or leaders so the would if they could find one join up on the 1st F4F they could find.This went on day after day untill they were realved on Oct 11th 1942. The weather was a huge facter durring this time because of thunderstorms and just bad weather in the area in generial.To give you some idea how much the weather affected the combat in the air, durring one battle late in Sept or early Oct. the enemy ordered a fighter sweep using 46 zeros. We were able to put up about the same number of F4Fs but due to the weather and the fact the zero had a time limit of about 15min. over the combat area only 12 total aircraft from boath sides saw any combat,this was not unusual. By Oct 11th when VMF 223 VMF212 were ordered home, out of the 19 pilots that landed in Aug only 9 made it home. I am not sure what the count was with VF5 or VMF 224. Out of the 12 SBDs from VMSB 232 that landed only one man walked off Guadalcanal and that was the CO. There are other things to condsider such as teaching our pilots to lead there target. This little fact might sound small but was very important. the tactic of attack on mass and then run if necessary.Our ability to to set up coastwatchers,the raidar on Guadalcanal only went out about 80 miles and was not as efective as you might think. In the F4F we had a fighter that was strong with pilot protection and the fact we didn`t have to go far from base to make contact with the enemy giving us more staying power.Over all it was our attitude.You make the enemy die for his country so you can live free in yours.
 
This is a Great Thread!

Thanks Guys. I've enjoyed reading all for your comments. Makes me want to get my Lundstrom books back off the shelf and re-read them. His commentarys are the some of the best. I had never realized how complicated the first year of the war was for the U.S. and Japaese Navys in the South Pacific. Equipment problems, lack of ships and fuel, the disparity of Japanese vs U.S. ships and aircraft and on and on. I don't think I had a clue what the U.S. Navy had to contend with until I read Lundstrom's "Black Shoe Carrier Admiral". His recounting of Fletcher's experience as the U.S. Navy and Marine Air learned how to fight the Japanese Navy was an eye opener for me, and no accounting of the Wildcat vs. Zero can really be understood absent the logistical nightmare that was Guadalcanal in 1942.
 
I wonder how many of the Japanese losses were due to enemy activity and how many were due to a pilot loitering or fighting a few minutes too long and not having enough fuel to make it home.

- Ivan.
 
Ivan said:
I wonder how many of the Japanese losses were due to enemy activity and how many were due to a pilot loitering or fighting a few minutes too long and not having enough fuel to make it home.

- Ivan.
Click to expand...

Interesting question - and without good radios and robust SAR capability, they were just as dead as if they'd been shot down.
 
I do not think that this discussion is good whereabouts. Aircraft can not be compared taking into account only results according to one side. Always exists in every order of life especially in a contest, and so understood it the Germans first team work, then the skill staff, and finally the logistics, who promedie all this better, will be the best. From what I read, today all pilot prefers maneuverability before strength and power of weaponry. This discussion is like comparing the Spitfire versus Messermith 109, we are all aware of the superiority of the Spitfire, however those who see results in an objective manner the bf 109 was the most fearsome or rather its pilot. According to S. Sakai the problem of the Japanese pilot was not working in team, but at the beginning of the war they had the best pilots and the best aircraft and began to have problems when the Americans began to work as a team using few advantages of its aircraft (speed of descent and weaponary):wavey:
 
Excellent program! I also read Sakai's biograhy Samurai! by Martin Caidin and Fred Saito. The planes he attacked after shooting down Sutherland were actually TBFs. Their "stinger" .50s in the ventral tail gun position were a large and unpleasant surprise for Sakai. His account of his return flight to Rabaul is riveting. The guy took a .50 caliber round through the head, and flew from Guadalcanal to Rabaul, some 500 miles with no instruments but a compass, and the left side of his body paralyzed.
 
Ghostrider said:
Excellent program! I also read Sakai's biograhy Samurai! by Martin Caidin and Fred Saito. The planes he attacked after shooting down Sutherland were actually TBFs. Their "stinger" .50s in the ventral tail gun position were a large and unpleasant surprise for Sakai. His account of his return flight to Rabaul is riveting. The guy took a .50 caliber round through the head, and flew from Guadalcanal to Rabaul, some 500 miles with no instruments but a compass, and the left side of his body paralyzed.
Click to expand...

I read Samurai! as well, Ghostrider. I'll bet a lot of people on this forum have. The thing that struck me about Sakai's book is the picture he paints of Japanese flight training, specifically, his opinion that it was too exacting in its standards, resulting in Japan not having the numbers of trained pilots they needed to replace those lost by attrition, especially in those flimsy Zeros. Did you notice the historian's comment that US soldiers could cut away pieces of a Zero's fuselage as souveneirs with their field knives?!!! Something else I noticed from the book, that was also seen in Letters From Iwo Jima, if these accounts are accurate, the Japanese Military had a real problem with their chain of command, with junior officers ignoring orders they considered "cowardly" or "dishonorable".

JAMES
 
I pretty much come to the conclusion that the A6M2 and F4F were an even match. If either of the pilots for the foes fight they were in big trouble.
 
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