Gettysburg

[redriver6]

Hey guys,

Being a history teacher, I'd like to add my two cents here. Regarding J.E.B. Stuart, let's clarify a couple of points...

1) Lee's speech in Gettysburg abashing Stuart is complete fiction. By every historical account I've ever read, the most that was ever said by Lee to Stuart was "General Stuart, you have arrived at last." It's not to say that it doesn't provide good drama...but it's completely false.

2) Stuart and Ewell are frequently the favorite "whipping boys" of the Gettysburg Campaign. With regards to Stuart, this is due to his being out of contact with the Confederate Army.

But to be fair...if you look at Stuart's conduct in previous campaigns, particularly his "Ride around McCellan" (whose conduct I consider to border on treason, but that's a discussion for another time) during the Peninsula Campaign and his successful commanding of infantry and artillery at Chancellorsville after Jackson was wounded, you will see that his conduct was outstanding, and he helped to reshape the role of cavalry.

In some of his other rides around various Union armies, Stuart did ride at a breathless pace, but these were short-duration events, such as riding 100 miles in three days, seventy miles in two days, or one hundred twenty-six miles in three days. However, during the weeks leading up to the Gettysburg Campaign, he was very busy, involved in screening operations in the Blue Ridge Mountains, and then was surprised at Brandy Station, Virginia.

Shortly thereafter, he was ordered to begin following Lee's Army north. The result of this was a long, sustained campaign without sufficient rest. After running into Hancock's Army moving north, Stuart didn't cross the Potomac until June 28th, entering Rockville, Maryland where he came across more than 125 wagon trains which he captured and now had to escort these wagons, along with try and ride around the Union Army. After bumping into Federal cavalry near Hanover, Stuart was forced to perform an all-night march, and it was only on July 1st that Stuart send out scouts to locate Lee's army. Staurt and his cavalry were now on the ragged edge of endurance, having ridden more than two hundred miles in eight days by the time he even got to Gettysburg!

Stuart may have also been suffering not only from a lack of rest, but also from what would later become known as "shell shock," especially after sustained combat operations in the months leading up to Gettysburg. General "Stonewall" Jackson may have suffered this same phenomenon after his sustained efforts in the exemplary Shenandoah Valley campaign in 1862, explaining his rather lackluster performance in the Seven days' campaign outside of Richmond.

I'm not saying that Stuart should be cleaned of any blame for his performance at Gettysburg, but one must also provide a fair picture.

BTW...A movie to watch with a great sound setup is "Midway," especially with a sub-woofer. :d

you sir are 100 percent correct in my opinion:ernae:

 

[Snuffy]

First: I acknowledge that I have a problem with Early and Ewell, I always get these two guys mixed up. LOL! Its true that Ewell was in charge of the Second Corps after Jackson, and at the time of Gettysburg, however, the charge of the day at Culp's Hill was in the hands of Early, who was on the field, and he wavered. (To those who caught this error of mine ... thanks.)

Secondly: I may have been less than precise in my statement "in placing blame" ... as we all know, there were a multitude of factors that went into the making of this disaster that's come to be known as Gettysburg. (Disaster, depending on which side you view it from ...) There is no doubt that the overall command of the Confederate forces failed in those days around Gettysburg, from Lee all the way down, and to actually try to place blame on any one in particular is being poor historians on our part.

That said, Rami, I will not disagree with you on some of the actions provided by Stuart during this campaign, but Stuart was given to the overtly caviler notion known as sensationalism. While he did his job in the part of screening the ANV on its move north, Lee's orders to him, were to remain between the ANV and the AOP. He failed in that. Had he been where he was supposed to be, I feel the outcome of Gettysburg would have been a different story.

Stuart's leaning to want to perform a part deux of his ride around the AOP at this time was a bad choice, despite any of the rewards he garnered in way of spoils. First, the object of his mission was to shield, protect, and guide the ANV, not out and cavorting over the country side. His decision to read more into Lee's commands was his failure and not that of Lee, though Lee was always one to allow subordinate discretion, Lee's orders were very loosely worded in most cases, to all his subordinates, and they were never cut and dried direct commands. That just wasn't Lee's style. (So partly to blame Lee for this, he could have been more emphatic in his orders.)

For Stuart to leave his post of importance and cavort around the backside of the Union Army did nothing for the cause, and certainly didn't aide the campaign. At best, he distracted only one Corps of the AOP and maybe their Cavalry Corps, but obviously not enough forces to cripple the AOP.

I have the utmost respect for Stuart, in most cases, truly a man who changed the face and course of military actions. To his credit also, we fail to mention that during this second ride round the Union army, Stuart only took 3 brigades of Cav with him, leaving the other two divisions of the Cavalry Corps in Beverly Robertson's hands. (A less than inspiring individual.)

I have to disagree with you about the 1862 ride though. Stuart did exactly what was needed done at that time. The ANV was in a disorganized state, yet it was safe and behind earthworks and in friendly territory and it was making plans ... part of those plans were that all the information gathered about the disposition of the AOP was needed. In fact, Gen'l Lee in his instructions to Stuart at that time, hinted strongly, if not modestly suggested the ride that is now famous.

In the case of the operations of Gettysburg, the ANV though more competently organized, was afoot, was operating in hostile territory, and needed the eyes and the ears of the army to be close. While I won't go so far as to judge any action as treasonous, I will state that Stuart's indiscretion during the Gettysburg campaign was definitely disastrous and almost cost the ANV its life. (There was no such threat in 1862.)

As to the "suffering shell shock" .... I'm more suspect to believe that he was suffering humiliation from the last two encounters with the improving Yankee Cavalry, and he wanted to "restore" his position as the better of the forces.

One last point. I am, as I said, descendant from A.P. Hill, I am by rights and choice, a southern boy. I "enlisted" in a re-enactment group as a confederate soldier ... so I'm not out to prove the North right and the South wrong in this. This was just a bad case of bungled command.

"Save yer Dixie cups, the South'll rise again!"

(For some good reading ... "LEE'S LIEUTENANTS" by Douglass Southall Freeman is an excellent picture of the Confederate command through the course of the war.

 

[Rami]

First: I acknowledge that I have a problem with Early and Ewell, I always get these two guys mixed up. LOL! Its true that Ewell was in charge of the Second Corps after Jackson, and at the time of Gettysburg, however, the charge of the day at Culp's Hill was in the hands of Early, who was on the field, and he wavered. (To those who caught this error of mine ... thanks.)

Secondly: I may have been less than precise in my statement "in placing blame" ... as we all know, there were a multitude of factors that went into the making of this disaster that's come to be known as Gettysburg. (Disaster, depending on which side you view it from ...) There is no doubt that the overall command of the Confederate forces failed in those days around Gettysburg, from Lee all the way down, and to actually try to place blame on any one in particular is being poor historians on our part.

That said, Rami, I will not disagree with you on some of the actions provided by Stuart during this campaign, but Stuart was given to the overtly caviler notion known as sensationalism. While he did his job in the part of screening the ANV on its move north, Lee's orders to him, were to remain between the ANV and the AOP. He failed in that. Had he been where he was supposed to be, I feel the outcome of Gettysburg would have been a different story.

Stuart's leaning to want to perform a part deux of his ride around the AOP at this time was a bad choice, despite any of the rewards he garnered in way of spoils. First, the object of his mission was to shield, protect, and guide the ANV, not out and cavorting over the country side. His decision to read more into Lee's commands was his failure and not that of Lee, though Lee was always one to allow subordinate discretion, Lee's orders were very loosely worded in most cases, to all his subordinates, and they were never cut and dried direct commands. That just wasn't Lee's style. (So partly to blame Lee for this, he could have been more emphatic in his orders.)

For Stuart to leave his post of importance and cavort around the backside of the Union Army did nothing for the cause, and certainly didn't aide the campaign. At best, he distracted only one Corps of the AOP and maybe their Cavalry Corps, but obviously not enough forces to cripple the AOP.

I have the utmost respect for Stuart, in most cases, truly a man who changed the face and course of military actions. To his credit also, we fail to mention that during this second ride round the Union army, Stuart only took 3 brigades of Cav with him, leaving the other two divisions of the Cavalry Corps in Beverly Robertson's hands. (A less than inspiring individual.)

I have to disagree with you about the 1862 ride though. Stuart did exactly what was needed done at that time. The ANV was in a disorganized state, yet it was safe and behind earthworks and in friendly territory and it was making plans ... part of those plans were that all the information gathered about the disposition of the AOP was needed. In fact, Gen'l Lee in his instructions to Stuart at that time, hinted strongly, if not modestly suggested the ride that is now famous.

In the case of the operations of Gettysburg, the ANV though more competently organized, was afoot, was operating in hostile territory, and needed the eyes and the ears of the army to be close. While I won't go so far as to judge any action as treasonous, I will state that Stuart's indiscretion during the Gettysburg campaign was definitely disastrous and almost cost the ANV its life. (There was no such threat in 1862.)

As to the "suffering shell shock" .... I'm more suspect to believe that he was suffering humiliation from the last two encounters with the improving Yankee Cavalry, and he wanted to "restore" his position as the better of the forces.

One last point. I am, as I said, descendant from A.P. Hill, I am by rights and choice, a southern boy. I "enlisted" in a re-enactment group as a confederate soldier ... so I'm not out to prove the North right and the South wrong in this. This was just a bad case of bungled command.

"Save yer Dixie cups, the South'll rise again!"

(For some good reading ... "LEE'S LIEUTENANTS" by Douglass Southall Freeman is an excellent picture of the Confederate command through the course of the war.

Snuffy,

We're on the same page here. I'm not absolving Stuart of any blame, I do think that he did not stick to his orders as he should of, and yes, Southern honor was very important to many soldiers, and Stuart is certainly no exception. I just provided some background and am arguing that there were reasons why events transpired as they did.

Also...where did I give the impression that Stuart's ride around McCellan was a bad thing? I was actually stating that McCellan's conduct in the Peninsula Campaign borders on treason. (In retrospect, the way I structured that sentence was rather ambiguous, sorry!)

 

[Snuffy]

... Also...where did I give the impression that Stuart's ride around McCellan was a bad thing? I was actually stating that McCellan's conduct in the Peninsula Campaign borders on treason. (In retrospect, the way I structured that sentence was rather ambiguous, sorry!)

... But to be fair...if you look at Stuart's conduct in previous campaigns, particularly his "Ride around McCellan" (whose conduct I consider to border on treason, but that's a discussion for another time) during the Peninsula Campaign and his successful commanding of infantry and artillery at Chancellorsville after Jackson was wounded, you will see that his conduct was outstanding, and he helped to reshape the role of cavalry.

That would do it right there. The subject of the second quote was Stuart and not McClellan, so I took the (comment) to mean you were inferring it to Stuart. My Bad ...

McClellan's actions during the Peninsular campaign again, while I don't think they were intentionally treasonous, they were certainly the actions of a man that was not capable of the position he was in. There is no doubt that McClellan was an amazing organizer and there is no doubt he loved the machine he created (the AOP) but he failed in his use and wielding of that machine. I don't think it was done with intentional deliberation to hurt the North and its objectives.

 

[Eoraptor1]

I'm VERY impressed with you, Sim-Outhouse members. I half expected this thread to go bad by now, but you've been acting as adults. I salute you.

Part of the problem with these issues, I believe, is that eye-witness accounts of the battle do not agree. I know I posted a link to a Carol Reardon lecture in another thread, but I don't remember which at the top of my head. One of the things she points out is that the soldiers' diaries vary wildly as to when the prep artillery bombardment for Pickett's charge, began, and how long it lasted. Also, the revisionism on both sides began immediately. One thing that also needs to said IMO is how very deep in the doghouse Longstreet was in much of the South after the war. He criticized Lee's conduct at Gettysburg, took a job in the Grant administration, and was further guilty of not having been born a Virginian. Jubal Early was a prime mover in this, and also in the campaign to recreate Robert E. Lee as a demigod. (If you haven't already guess as much, I'm very suspicious of Leader fetish, and think this is something our species needs to outgrow if we don't want to go the way of the Passenger Pigeon.) People wanted to know how Gettysburg was "lost" and what had gone wrong. (If you're George Meade, nothing went wrong; if you're Abe Lincoln, what went wrong is that an immediate counterattack wasn't launched.) Early, and others in his camp, pointed the finger squarely at Longstreet, and his "inability" to carry out Lee's directives. I've never met George Pickett, but if I have him right, he never forgave Lee for the destruction of his division. I also think he gave the best answer as to why the ANV lost at Gettysburg: "I always thought the Yankees had something to do with it." Defending one's own dunghill is a very strong human impulse.

JAMES

 

[Rami]

I'm VERY impressed with you, Sim-Outhouse members. I half expected this thread to go bad by now, but you've been acting as adults. I salute you.

Part of the problem with these issues, I believe, is that eye-witness accounts of the battle do not agree. I know I posted a link to a Carol Reardon lecture in another thread, but I don't remember which at the top of my head. One of the things she points out is that the soldiers' diaries vary wildly as to when the prep artillery bombardment for Pickett's charge, began, and how long it lasted. Also, the revisionism on both sides began immediately. One thing that also needs to said IMO is how very deep in the doghouse Longstreet was in much of the South after the war. He criticized Lee's conduct at Gettysburg, took a job in the Grant administration, and was further guilty of not having been born a Virginian. Jubal Early was a prime mover in this, and also in the campaign to recreate Robert E. Lee as a demigod. (If you haven't already guess as much, I'm very suspicious of Leader fetish, and think this is something our species needs to outgrow if we don't want to go the way of the Passenger Pigeon.) People wanted to know how Gettysburg was "lost" and what had gone wrong. (If you're George Meade, nothing went wrong; if you're Abe Lincoln, what went wrong is that an immediate counterattack wasn't launched.) Early, and others in his camp, pointed the finger squarely at Longstreet, and his "inability" to carry out Lee's directives. I've never met George Pickett, but if I have him right, he never forgave Lee for the destruction of his division. I also think he gave the best answer as to why the ANV lost at Gettysburg: "I always thought the Yankees had something to do with it." Defending one's own dunghill is a very strong human impulse.

JAMES

James,

Your comments are well taken. It's interesting you mention Longstreet, he was one of the few who dared criticize Lee, despite Lee admitting to his men after Pickett's charge that "it was all my fault." After the war, Longstreet became a Republican, thus becoming a "scalawag."

Mentioning Pickett, it's my understanding that not only did he admit Yankee success, he also blamed Lee for the rest of his life for his losses at Gettysburg. And yes, Lee had been anointed to a demigod status. Part of that is due to a lack of tarnish: he never wrote a memoir, and unlike Longstreet, he died within a decade of the war's end.

Also, I find that many of my students make the mistake as seeing the Confederate loss at Gettysburg as the death knell of the Confederacy. In my opinion, the loss of Vicksburg and thus any control of the Mississippi proved the more decisive blow, occurring a day later. However, this is not to say the Confederacy was dead at this point, one must remember that the Confederacy came close once again to victory in the fall, the Chattanooga campaign was a decisive Confederate success until the arrival of Grant, they certainly kept Rosecrans in check, yet another Union commander who made decisions in quicksand when they counted most.

And finally, don't forget one important fact when you discuss Gettysburg: The significance of the fire at the Tredegar Iron works in Richmond during the Spring of 1863. This was the nexus of Confederate high-quality military manufacture, and the temporary loss of this facility at this crucial moment played a significant role during the battle, specifically fuses.

Colonel Alexander, first in his class at West Point before Virginia seceded, was the Confederate artillery commander who decimated the Union troops at Fredricksburg. This was due in part to the quality of fuses from Tredegar which allowed him a steady rate of fire and the ability to aim his guns reliably. At Gettysburg, the fuses were from different facilities all over the South, many of these were "cottage industries," and as a result, there was little uniformity in manufacture. During the battle, Alexander couldn't understand why he was consistently overshooting, it was almost as if the gods were conspiring against him, or so he thought. What was actually occurring was these these fuses were burning "long." If Confederate artillery fire had been as reliable at Gettysburg as it had been at other sites, such as Chancellorsville and Fredricksburg, then it might very well had led to another victory for Lee.

Oh yeah...Buford's dismounted defense notwithstanding, he did have one other advantage in his pocket which the Confederates lacked that I believe helped him buy time holding them off: breech-loaded rifles which could fire at a rate several times faster than the traditional musket.

 

[TARPSBird]

I'm VERY impressed with you, Sim-Outhouse members. I half expected this thread to go bad by now, but you've been acting as adults. I salute you.

Raptor, I was thinking the same thing. It's exceptional to see a "history geek" thread go to multiple pages without getting locked in the end. This is a great discussion - do you guys really know this much Civil War stuff or do you keep reference books handy? :d

 

[Rami]

Reply...

Raptor, I was thinking the same thing. It's exceptional to see a "history geek" thread go to multiple pages without getting locked in the end. This is a great discussion - do you guys really know this much Civil War stuff or do you keep reference books handy? :d

Tarpsbird,

Every historian / teacher's answer to that is the former, but in truth it's likely a bit of both.

 

[Snuffy]

I'm a proud owner of a $9,000.00 US dollar library on the ACW ... (those were 1985 dollars too ... I have no idea what it costs in today's dollars.)

I've read every one of the books I have at least once, many twice.

 

[Rami]

Reply...

I'm a proud owner of a $9,000.00 US dollar library on the ACW ... (those were 1985 dollars too ... I have no idea what it costs in today's dollars.)

I've read every one of the books I have at least once, many twice.

Please tell me Battle Cry of Freedom is on that list.

 

[Snuffy]

Its been a long while since I've looked ... Most of my library sits in moving boxes that never got unpacked from a move made several years ago. (procrastination is a terrible thing ...) However, I'd safely bet that it is among the books I have. I can't even tell you what box has what books.

 

[Rami]

Reply...

Snuffy,

No problem, just thought I'd ask. It's about 865 pages, I've read it three times. Come to think of it, I have a ninth-grader who's been causing problems in my class since the beginning of the year. Perhaps if he does it again I'll assign it to him for weekend reading and then ask him to write a ten-page summary. That will put a kink in his colon...

 

[redriver6]

Also, I find that many of my students make the mistake as seeing the Confederate loss at Gettysburg as the death knell of the Confederacy. In my opinion, the loss of Vicksburg and thus any control of the Mississippi proved the more decisive blow, occurring a day later.

Vicksburg tends to be overshadowed by Gettysburg but it was a far greater strategic loss than Gettysburg. Lee's army was hurt but not destroyed...Vicksburg could never be recovered.

Lincoln said Vicksburg is the key and he was right.

also...this is the 'High Water Mark of the Confederacy'...not Pickett's Charge..

6PM on the 2nd day..

Most people consider the heights reached by Pickett's charge were the high water mark of the Confederacy. However, on the second day Brigadier General Ambrose Wright's brigade not only reached the rock wall but crossed over it and penetrated far enough into the Union defenses to see the other side of the ridge. Wright's brigade was next to last involved in the fight that day. The brigades to his right had been forced to retreat, BG Carnot Posey was to his left and was unable to offer the support Wright needed. BG William Mahone was to Posey's left and never entered the fight.

If there had been any support for this penetration, the battle would probably have ended then and there..notice how close they were to Meade's HQ..

http://www.jmarlinmurphy.com/CW%20HTM%20Folder/Posey2ndDay.html

and just as a 'btw' i had two ancestors present..one in the 21st MS Barksdale's brigade and one in the 10th Alabama Wilcox's brigade.

 

[Snuffy]

... and just as a 'btw' i had two ancestors present..one in the 21st MS Barksdale's brigade and one in the 10th Alabama Wilcox's brigade.

Me too ... well not the same two you had ... but A.P. Hill and Henry J Hunt, and oddly enough both from my mother's side.

 

[Ken Stallings]

I'm VERY impressed with you, Sim-Outhouse members. I half expected this thread to go bad by now, but you've been acting as adults. I salute you.

Part of the problem with these issues, I believe, is that eye-witness accounts of the battle do not agree. I know I posted a link to a Carol Reardon lecture in another thread, but I don't remember which at the top of my head. One of the things she points out is that the soldiers' diaries vary wildly as to when the prep artillery bombardment for Pickett's charge, began, and how long it lasted. Also, the revisionism on both sides began immediately. One thing that also needs to said IMO is how very deep in the doghouse Longstreet was in much of the South after the war. He criticized Lee's conduct at Gettysburg, took a job in the Grant administration, and was further guilty of not having been born a Virginian. Jubal Early was a prime mover in this, and also in the campaign to recreate Robert E. Lee as a demigod. (If you haven't already guess as much, I'm very suspicious of Leader fetish, and think this is something our species needs to outgrow if we don't want to go the way of the Passenger Pigeon.) People wanted to know how Gettysburg was "lost" and what had gone wrong. (If you're George Meade, nothing went wrong; if you're Abe Lincoln, what went wrong is that an immediate counterattack wasn't launched.) Early, and others in his camp, pointed the finger squarely at Longstreet, and his "inability" to carry out Lee's directives. I've never met George Pickett, but if I have him right, he never forgave Lee for the destruction of his division. I also think he gave the best answer as to why the ANV lost at Gettysburg: "I always thought the Yankees had something to do with it." Defending one's own dunghill is a very strong human impulse.

JAMES

James,

This is a very insightful and accurate post.

Early is considered a prime ringleader in the post-war creation of a cult of personality, celebrity worship of Lee. It is not merely ironic, nor an accident, that his efforts began after Lee died. Lee would never had allowed it while he was alive, especially the associated effort to discredit and sully Longstreet.

Regarding Pickett, the man stayed very close friends with Longstreet after the war. In terms of Lee, Pickett met Lee at his home just once after the war ended, and according to a witness Lee was icy cold. Pickett left the house with this witness and reported that Pickett said, "That old man destroyed my division!"

So, clearly, for Lee, the meeting was singularly awkward. For Pickett, it would appear it was an opportunity for Lee to apologize. Given Lee did not, the meeting ended awkwardly and with Pickett as bitter as ever.

My view of Douglas Southall Freeman is that he was a perpetuator of the myth of Lee as a demigod upon the earth. He did not create it, but he certainly sought to perpetuate it and ignored a lot of additional information and first-hand accounts that would have balanced his efforts. At best, I consider his work historically inaccurate. More likely, it was an act of political prosecution masked as historical research! His biography was singular in its point of view that Lee was nearly flawless and if not for ineptness among subordinate generals, the Army of Northern Virginia would have had an uninterrupted string of victories. This is pure bunk!

I have read extensively a myriad of books regarding Lee and Longstreet. This includes Freehall's seminal biography on Lee. In comparing notes, I am convinced the Freehall was deliberately misleading in his comments on Longstreet's conduct at Gettysburg. Longstreet's own biography is far more balanced even as it often gives short shrift to his own subordinates.

In reading the cumulative books, the thing I'm most struck with is how horribly disfunctional the entire CSA leadership was in the war and am forced to conclude the major miracle of the war is how the south could have stayed whole for as long as it did! Between such clearly inept commanders as Braxton Bragg, such blind loyalty to him as Jefferson Davis showed to him, and the refusal to husband forces as Lee sometimes did, I am amazed the CSA did as well as it did!

I mainly chalk that up in the Virginia theater to a string of mostly lackluster Union corps commanders, especially McClellan, for whom I am convinced handed the CSA victory in the first year of the war. Ending that war during the Penninsula Campaign (entirely likely given solid generalship) would have drastically altered national history and rendered the CSA as more a footnote of forlorn ambition, vice tearing the nation to shreds and put the south into 50 years of economic depravity and continued racial strife.

While Longstreet had genuine affinity and respect for Lee, it must be noted that his view of Joseph Johnston was significantly better. Personally, I wish Davis has sacked Bragg and replaced him with Longstreet. I believe Atlanta would never had been sacked and Sherman's March would never had happened.

Lee was an excellent general, one of the abliest of the war. However, he simply was too late in recognizing the essential need for the CSA to husband their resources in the fight, and to realize that time was on their side with an effective maneuver defensive warfare strategy. All the ANV really needed was a few more Frederecksburg's and the whole complexion of the war could have changed due to domestic antagonism against Lincoln. If Lee had better understood this prior to Gettysburg, when he truly did accept the painful lesson, and had Longstreet commanded the Tennessee Campaign, I think things would have turned out considerably differently.

Of course, for the benefit of the nation, I'm thankful the mistakes the CSA made were made, and only wished they had been made worse and the Union commanders in the first year in Virginia had seized the initiative better. Grant knew the "mathematics" as Lincoln said, and knew if the "thing were pressed" the CSA and ANV had no chance. Grant's casualties were horrible, but he pressed the continuous offensive by repeated flanking maneuvers. He did what Longstreet knew was the great danger.

The war wasn't a "Lost Cause" the post-war Confederate "history" tried to sum it up as. It was, however, a very unbalanced contest and the south had to perform substantially better than the Union forces, and do so in a way that bled the Union and husbanded Confederate manpower. In the West, Grant destroyed all hope of that outcome as he was the better general with the superior assets. In the Virginia campaign, once the Union put Grant in charge, the same brutal mathematics came to fruition and the ANV bled too many resources in prior battles.

I give Lee universal admiration for helping ensure the war ended on sustainable terms without guerilla warfare, which many CSA commanders advocated. I give Grant complete credit for seeking humane terms of surrender to help ensure that tragedy was avoided.

Cheers,

Ken

 

[djscoo]

This is a timely thread! We are discussing the American Civil War in my history class currently. We watched an excerpt from Ken Burn's documentary, and the part that I found most fascinating was the footage of Civil War veterans during the 1930's. I know this makes me sound terribly ignorant, but seeing the actual men who fought moving around and was like a moment of enlightenment. I had never even entertained the idea that these were actual people who fought, and there were survivors. It was odd, and as soon as I got home today I looked for more film footage of Civil War Veterans.

[YOUTUBE]MIJaxu3w4-U[/YOUTUBE]

 

[Snuffy]

Mr. Burn's stuff is good ... you should be able to buy the whole documentary from PBS ... I highly recommend it.

 

[TeaSea]

Damn! I come home and the Thread's gone two pages beyond me!!

1) I think Ken is right about Longstreet's march to the Union left. He came under observation and had to change his plan. He came under observation because of Little Round Top. By sheer accident, LRT was clear cut on the one side of the hill that had complete observations of Longstreet's movement, and the rest of the battlefield up towards the fishhook around Culp's Hill. It's the ONLY place on the battlefield that offers that view (Seminary Ridge was hidden by forest). I've often wondered about that. What if the two years previous the owner had cut on the other side of the hill?

2) Stuart's dressing down from Lee is fictional...but it's a great scene nonetheless. I'm one of those who thinks Stuart is unfairly castigated for his role in the battle, along with Longstreet. Stuarts orders were somewhat ambiguous, (he received directions from Lee, Early, and Longstreet) and commander's, especially cavalry commanders, were expected to use their initiative and broadly interpret their commander's intent. In any case, Lee's main body was left with over 3 brigades of cavalry, which he elected not to use.

3) The Southern cause was lost with Vicksburg, not Gettysburg. Agree with that contention wholeheartedly.

4) Napoleonic tactics are often criticized, but people who make those broad comments do not consider the alternatives of attempting to control troops who probably can't hear after the first two volleys. Weaponry had progressed well enough to do extensive damage (an 1859 rifled musket has roughly the same point target range as an M-16A2) but to achieve effects you still had to mass fire, which meant tight formations. And they were LOUD and SMOKEY. You had to keep people together to keep control.

5) Pickett's response to the question on Gettysburg is the right response.

There, I'm spent...have to work my daughter's taxes.....

 

[Eoraptor1]

Please tell me Battle Cry of Freedom is on that list.

+1 for Jim McPherson's Battle Cry of Freedom. This is the one Civil War book to have if you're going to have only one IMO. If you give that assignment, Rami, make sure your Problem Child hasn't cut and pasted the synopsis from Wikipedia.

Carol Reardon Booknotes interview HERE: http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/96629-1


JAMES

 

[Ken Stallings]

Yes, communications were vastly restricted then, however, Longstreet destroyed that myth that large battles had to be fought with centralized control. He did this with the extended skirmish line attacks at the Battle of the Wilderness. It worked spectacularly. He had the entire Union front before his troops retreated in confusion and disarray.

Then Longstreet was shot by his own men (accidentally, of course) and just like Jackson a year earlier, it deflated the Confederate initiative.

That was the real problem. Even when the Confederates had the master stroke going for them, they didn't have the ability to press the advantage to actual conclusion. Never once did the CSA leave the battleground of a major battle with more aggregate forces than the Union had!

If the Union had the tactical advantage and Lee blundered like Burnsides did at Fredericksburg, then the CSA would have lost the war in Virginia that very day.

For the Union, they could launch another massive offensive within a few weeks!

Back to the original point ... Longstreet took an entire corps worth of Confederate troops and quickly launched them into the Union in countless small units, essentially company and platoon cohesive units. It worked because of the nature of the thick forest. It wasn't an accident. It was a concept of battle that had been percolating inside Longstreet's mind for a long time. It was revolutionary because it adopted the modern concept of small units acting with independence as a combined strategic effort. This was something that even generals in World War I considered impossible.

However, later in the great war, such looser arrangement of troops was adopted.

While most of his peers were fighting a war of Napoleonic tactics, Longstreet was representing an idea that morphed during World War I! And yet, none of his tactical and strategic vision was captured in even period American military training doctrine. It wasn't until after World War I that what Longstreet wrote and thought was seriously studied at West Point.

Organizing ground units along flexible options, maneuvering your enemy into a position of tactical disadvantage and then coercing that enemy to attack you at a fortified position, and avoiding engagement when the positions are reversed, are all concepts of modern maneuver warfare.

It is the classic concept that in the PTO of World War II was termed, "island hopping." Longstreet, in my view, would have never attacked the fortified positions at Malvern Hill, Little Round Top, or Seminary Ridge. He would have maneuvered his forces to a position of fortified strength between Meade's forces and Washington, and dared Meade to attack.

He understood that the south merely had to survive. The Union had to win.

The problem for the CSA is that even if Longstreet had gotten his way, the war was still a disaster on every other theater. Only in Virginia did the Confederates actually win a significant share of battles. And in Tennessee, it was really only Longstreet's efforts against Rosecrans that yeilded any significant Confederate victories there.

Everywhere else, it was mostly a Union rout.

Ken