OK.. as I happen to wander in here most days and tend to read a variety of things and have controlled airplanes longer than many of the pilots here have been able to read I finally got to the point where I have to toss in more than a couple of cents worth.
(Excerpts from the initial AvWeb report on May 10th http://www.avweb.com/eletter/archives/avflash/1627-full.html#202510)
Speaking for the JFK Controller union, Steve Abraham told ABC news the pilot "had no choice. He couldn't land 22L, it would have been illegal for him," due to the crosswind. Wind was 320 at 23 gusting to 35, at the time. JFK's main runway, 31 Left, has been closed for upgrades for about eight weeks, and controllers say that maintaining the flow of traffic at the airport has led to some less than ideal clearances.
(typical media reporting, there is no JFK Controller union per se)
Obviously, the concerns were not unique on that day and it's been well-documented already.
FAA spokesman Arlene Sarlac told AVweb Thursday that the agency studied the situation "for over a year" prior to closing the runway and worked with airlines who "agreed to reduce their schedules during this closure time." The FAA says the situation at JFK is safe.
So, it's not like it was a surprize set of conditions... I would offer an opinion that every JFK-bound airline has numerous NOTAMS and Ops Letters posted in dispatch and sent to crews. The discussions about procedures at JFK during the construction would have been signed-off by the airlines as well as the PNYA and the FAA. While airlines obviously don't like carrying extra fuel and have been shown to 'shave it' on occasion, there must have been (or should have been) conversations between crews and company ops regarding the possibility of extended approaches into JFK, including the extra flight time if a runway change is made. However there is also pressure on pilots from 'company' to keep fuel uploads to the minimum required with no 'extra for the wife and kids' (that's why SIDS and STARS came into existence and are so important now)-and pilots as well as controllers are subject to performance appraisals from management.
JFK's 14,572 foot-long 13R/31L, was closed in March to undergo a four-month-long facelift that includes widening and repaving. The closure is expected to last through June and means that traffic must be diverted to the airport's three remaining runways. Controllers say the American Airlines event shows that maintaining the traffic flow, without incurring delays, has presented challenges. According to the FAA, the situation was studied ahead of time, the airlines are flying on reduced schedules and operations at the airport are safe.
Seems some of the pilots and spectators here and elsewhere can't differentiate between an individual controller and the FAA (two groups that are often at loggerheads - when it doesn't go the public's way it's the fault of a union, but if it's a policy it's a dang bureaucracy). The JFK controllers -as at many other facilities have fought preferential runways and local procedures as hard as the pilots for the same safety reasons, but airlines want the shortest route so are loathe to press the political fight. At the same time, the FAA is dependent on the taxpayer dollar (there are more lawyers than pilots) and has been forced (often in court) to bow to the NIMBYs, while at the same time pressure from the poor, cash-strapped airlines for minimum-distance approaches has ended up with a lot of these 'agreements' that neither the ALPA nor NATCA have had a vote upon. Factor in that the airports are dependant on revenue and don't want to be seen as the cause of some businessman being delayed if a corner can be cut or traffic jammed in. There is another measurement - "Runway Acceptance Rate" (how many can you shove into the bottom of the funnel in an hour - working in exits, distance to the ramp, crossing traffic, taxi flows) and most airports have some combinations that are far better than others.. and with the loss of a parallel runway those get more complicated at the best of times. I think, come push to shove, most pilots would opt for landing on a shorter runway, at light weight with a contrary wind than to try to depart (in this case 22) heavily loaded with a tailwind component. Everyone should be able to imagine what it would be like using ONLY Rwy 31R for arrivals and departures and what those delays would cost in time and money to the airlines. It's easy to just view it from a single viewpoint and think it's simple if you don't look at how the system HAS to work to accommodate ALL the stakeholders (including the paying pax demands for "on-time performance"). This ain't Kansas Toto - it's one of the most complex ATC/airport environments in the world.
After receiving their clearance, the crew of American Flight 2 said, "We can't land on 22," adding, "We're breaking off approach and if you don't give us to Runway 31R, we're going to declare an emergency." The controller responded "alright, I'll pass it along, fly runway heading for now."
For the Tower controller to unilaterally 'just swing one plane around to another runway' -which was being used for only departures- several events have to take place. First, the Tower (local controller) has to ensure that there is no ground traffic in the way (there was.. an aircraft had just been turned onto 31R - and that Ground stops all possible crossing traffic. Then (at the same time) has to hit the hotline to Approach to make space for a crossing-runway landing with what could be a stream of traffic with minimum separation on final for 22L (in fact, an AWE Airbus had to execute a missed approach) and estimate the time required for a circling procedure to sequence that other traffic, and coordinate the circling with Departure as AA2 may have had to widen into the departure or arrival flows in congested airspace, AND pass traffic to the diverging aircraft and any others that may be in comflict. Some of that HAS to be done to reduce or remove the possibility of a nose-to-nose conflict due to the circling 767. (all that in less time than I took to type it and about as long as it takes you to read it.)
With no indication from the pilot of a time-critical situation , the safest, most organized and logical process is to have AA2 continue straight ahead in stable flight while some of the coordination is done (remember AA2 is still likely 6-10 miles on final approach at initial contact with the tower) and even if he's going to do a circling, still could maintain 1000-1500 ft down the runway and circle to a left-hand pattern for 31R.
Note that the wx was not serious - the pilot of AA2 commenced (as stated) a
Visual approach for 31R so there were a lot of plan-able options. The pilot was able to commence a turn, circle and line up for 31R while close in to the airport - in fact close enough that pax on the Airbus following on the approach for 22 saw the 767 'turning at them' as they were going around. Not the large, stable approach assumed to be required. What would have happened, in spite of the pilot's considerable skill, if he had misjudged that tight, visual approach and then had to perform a balked landing and another circuit (still in an 'emergency situation')?
For those who advocate ATC immediately and unilaterally changing runways to be most appropriate for the wind, remember that the policy dictated by FAA administration, in agreement with the airlines and the Port of NY Authority probably has agreed-to limitations (as evidenced by the on-going use of "land 22, depart 31R") that had been in process for some time that day.
Also look at a chart of the area. It would not surprise me to find a set of agreements between NYC TRACON and the various towers in the area that the 'active runway' has to be coordinated and similar for all area IFR airports to avoid numerous conflicting traffic flows over the whole NYC area. Therefore, a runway change at one airport (eg. when there is a significant wind shift) takes time (I'll guess from experience, somewhere in the neighbourhood of 20 minutes for each of the towers to shift ground flows, circle a few (and still negotiate out-of-wind landings and departures for the most immediately involved) AND for TRACON a lead time of at least 20 minutes to vector everyone to the new runway, switch STARS and SIDS and likely detour some aircraft well out of the way to make room for the new flow AND for CENTER to begin reroutes and reissue revised clearances (in the event of communication failure) which starts perhaps 90 miles out and also requires coordination with adjacent Centers. As I look at the chart I can see all sorts of scenarios where a runway change at JFK would effectively shut down operations at, at least, LGA, NWK until it could be accomodated in the whole flow.
Bear in mind that no one has produced any evidence showing whether the crew of AA2 made their situation known at any point prior to contacting JFK tower (approx. 3 minutes from the threshold). While it IS difficult, the "system" (the human part of ATC) can make it work
for an individual aircraft if there is a known reason - and with minimal extra fuel required if the plan starts early enough. BTW, ATC does know of general crosswind limitations but, unless provided locally, does not know individual operators' procedures or limits. (I once was required to file against an airline pilot for landing below prescribed wx minima, only to find out the airline had a special approval for lower...). With no apparent indication of ANY 'minimum fuel' issue the question is compounded as to what course can be taken.
Also consider things that we may never hear about...
- Had the controllers (plural) been subjected to constant complaints all day from pilots who had then gone on to land safely with the crosswind and (without knowing AAL limits) heard another pilot crying "Wolf!" without a timely explanation of the absolute need for 31R?
- Were the winds increasing or had the same conditions applied to one or two or three hours of preceding traffic?
- Had those winds JUST increased beyond the AAL B767 limits or had the crew discussed options all the way in from Ohio?
- Was this the first such concern/complaint that day for the ATC crews on duty?
- Were they already in the process of that 20 min. - 1 hour exercise in coordination to change runways?
- Was it easier to do a low-level "emergency" circling over New York and explain it to the pax as "ATC's fault" than to explain to them an overshoot and vectors due to a Company limitation and airport policies that they wouldn't have the interest or knowledge to understand - or that may make some question the capabilities of American Airlines when other flights beat them to the gate?
- was the crew running short of flight time?
- Was the captain due at his kids' soccer game?
- Was the Captain pissed at the thought of being number one and then having to be number 6 (or two or 12) - and don't tell me he'd never think that...
- Had he had bad experiences at JFK and developed an attitude of "I'll show them who's boss"? (and no sanctimonious cries of "NEVER!").
I have to say I am dismayed that so many people (on all the forums) with so little knowledge and experience hold such inflexible and simplistic opinions. Controllers and the system they make work are not perfect, but neither are pilots and that's partly why there are courses on Crew Resource Management (CRM) and 'cockpit decision making' is trained right from the PPL level. It all minimizes the problems, but cannot ever remove ALL of them. BTW, some airlines include ATC in the CRM process as part of the team that moves pax.
Until the investigation is complete (and with the media attention and this sort of discussion all over the Web there WILL be an investigation to determine: "Was there any factor that required an "immediate landing"?") no one knows the truth.
Until then, remember the old saying about "having walked a mile in his shoes"...
:ernae: