wonderful Rami, thanks so much.
here is some background for those interested....
Italian Naval Base at Taranto
In due course an official RAF Opinion was delivered on the subject of barrage balloons, but the navy had already modified its plan to take them into account.
Although the Italians had nothing in the way of radar, the area around Taranto was guarded by thirteen huge electrical listening devices that could hear an airplane many miles away. There were three rows of barrage ballons: one along the eastern Edge of the harbor, one on the mile long Diga Breakwater di Tarantola and a third in the middle of the cruiser anchorage in the northern half of the main harbor. What the British could not have known however is that of ninety ballons recently installed sixty had been destroyed in bad weather around November 6 and had not been replaced because of a shortage of hydrogen
Scattered around the periphery of the harbor were 21 batteries of four inch anti aircraft guns, 84 automatic cannons of twenty and thirty seven millimeters and 108 light machine guns. Twenty two modern searchlights were ready to illuminate attacking planes and dazzle the pilots destroying their night vision.
The six battleships, seven cruisers, and twenty eight destroyers in the inner and outer harbors of Taranto mounted more than 600 antiaircraft machine guns. Further under the surface of the water were huge steel mesh nets that could catch torpedoes. These nets suspende from buoys extended across much of the harbor. The harbor authorities had ordered 14,000 yards of net but several senior Italian officers feared that the nets woudl interere with ships manuvering so only 4,600 yards of netter were in position on Novemmber 11, 1940.
The admiral in charge of the port, Arturo Riccardi, was fully aware of the likelilhood of an airborne torpedo attack and at nightfall the harbor defesnes were put on high alert. In an offical report by the Italian commander in chief afloat to the chief of naval staff dated November 10, 1940, he enumerated the guns, searchlights, listening devices and nets and described the plans for dealing with moonlight attacks, the scheme for coordinating shore based guns with those on ships the clear anticipation of imminent attack and the extensive state of readiness.
In brief, twenty one slow, heavily laden, canvas covered airplanes were to launch an attack against battleships with armor ten inches thick in a harbor with approximately 800 antiaircraft guns, against an enemy that was expecting them. The sky contained thirty steel cables suspended from balloons and the sea held 12,000 linear feet of steel nets to catch torpedoes.
With the loss of the Eagle, several Swordfish and a revised timetable, the final Royal Navy attack plan, glorious in its complexity, took the following form:
The naval craft of the RN were organized for this operation into six groups. Force A consisted of the battleships Warspite, Malaya and Valiant: the aircraft carrier Illustrious: the cruisers Glocester and York and the destroyers Hyperion, Havock, Hero, Hwereward, Hasty, Ilex, Decoy, Defender, Nubian, Mohawk, Janus, Juno and Jervis.
Force B contined the cruisers Ajax and Syndey. Their initial assignment was to take troops and equipment form Port Said in Egypt to Suda Bay on the northern shore of Crete and there get Bofors antiaircraft guns mounted. The Sydney was then to join Force A: the Ajax was to remian at Suda Bay until relieved by the Calcutta and then join Force A. Force C consisted of merely the cruiser Orion which was to take RAF supplies and personnel to Piraeus, the harbor near Athens and then to proceed to Suda Bay. Force D was comprised of the battleshiop Ramilles; the antiaircraft Cruisers Coventry and Calcutta, the destroyers Vampire, Voyager, Waterhen, Dainty, Diamond and Wyrneck and the slow trawlers Kinsgston Coral, and Sindonis, and the minesweeper Abingdon.
Force F consisted of reinforcements from England bound for the Mediterranean fleet: the battleship Barham, the cruisers Berwick and Glasgow and the destroyers Griffin, Greyhound and Gallant. Force F also contained on temprary loan from Force H, the destroyers Faulknor, Fortune and Fury.
Force H based at Gibraltar under Vice Adm Sir James Somerville escorted Force F as far as Malta and returned to its Gibralter base. For the operation, Force H consisted of the aircraft carrier, Ark Royal, the cruiser Sheffield and the destroyers Duncan, Isis, Foxhound, Forester and Firedrake.
Intimately connected with these six naval forces were four convoy groups of supply and transport ships. Convoy AN6 carrying petrol and bunker fuel from Egypt to Greece, sailed on Novemeber 4 from Port Said and consisted of the Dutch ship, Abinda, and the British ships Pass of Balmaha and British Sergeant. The convoy was limted to seven knots because the armed trawlers Kingston Coral and Sindonis were even slower than the merchant ships. This convoy was escorted part of the way by the antiaircraft ship Calcutta. As they neared Crete, the Calcutta went ahead to assist operations at Suda Bay, which were still quite undeveloped and the convoy steamed on along the northern coast of Crete arriving safely in Piraeus with its anxiously awaited cargo of supplies and petrol. To its good fortune, it had seen nothing of enemy submaries or aircraft.
Convoy MW3 which left Alexandria, Egypt on November 5 consisted of the transports Waiwera, Devins, Plumleaf, Volo and Rodi, bound for Malta and two ships headed for Suda Bay; the Brisbane Star, carrying trucks and mobile AA guns and the Brambleleaf with bunker fuel and gasoline. On November 8, MW3 rendezvoused with Force A halfway between Crete and Malta, and the naval vessels took a covering position to the north of the convoy. Near noon that day an Italian reconnsisance craft spotted the convoy and radioed its postion before being chased off by Gladiators. At this point, the fleet and the convoy were about 180 miles from Scily. Before 2:00 PM seven SM79 bomberes appeared, British Fulmars shot down two and the remaining five bombers dropped their bombs and returned to Sciliy. The following day, the Ramilles and theee destroyers were detached to convoy MW3 to its destination on Malta while the remainder of the fleet remained at sea. (to be continued)
The Attack on Taranto: Blueprint for Pearl Harbour T..P. Lowry, J. Wellham and other sources...