Smashing Time
Charter Member 2014
OK, I have too say my piece here without trying to be antagonistic.
In late 1942 the Luftwaffe under the savvy leadership of Adolf Galland issued the following directive:
a. The attack from the rear against a four engined bomber formation promises little success and almost always brings big losses. If an attack from the rear must be carried through it should be done from above or below and the fuel tanks and engines should be aiming points.
b. the attack from the sides can be effective but requires thorough training and good gunnery.
c. The attack from the front, front high, front low, all with low speed was the most effective of all. Flying ability, good aiming and closing up to the shortest possible range are the prerequisites for success.
d. The exit can be succeed only in a sharp turn in the direction of the bomber formation single bomber. The most important factor is the angle of bank with which the fighter leaves the bomber formation.
e. Basically the strongest weapon is the masses and repeated attack by an entire fighter formation such cases, the defensive fire can be weakened and the bomber formation be broken up.
This was a preferred attack by many of the experienced Luftwaffe pilots.
With unacceptable losses at the time the AAF needed some changes.
The XB-40, a modified B-17F, laden with heavy armament conducted firepower test with the AAF as early as 1942. Later Douglas built the YB-40 with a chin turret and staggered waist gun positions Twelve of the YB-40's flew combat with the 92nd BG between May & August of 1943. The gunships with up to 17,000 rounds of amunition were to act as a defensive curtain in the formations. They were slow and gas guzzlers. Although the test determined the plane was not practical as a standalone version the defensive test showed advantage of a chin turret was clearly a proven winner and a new series, labeled the B-17G went into production. The Bendix nose turret mounted two .50-cal. guns that relieved the Bombardier from the burden of a single center of the nose gun and all its bulk and clutter. He could easily switch from his primary duties to the IP and move to the swing out yoke control. The staggered waist gunner positions were incorporated too. This was considered by the crews an improvement despite a loss of top speed. The first G's were showing up in Sept-Oct 1943 with the Eighth AF. For the nose cabin crew the extra fire power was at least psychologically re-assuring when facing 20mm canon fire heading at them.
After the P-47 started an attrition rate of experienced Luftwaffe fighter pilots and the introduction of the G model, Galland reluctantly reversed directives in September 1943 . Now the primary attack was from the rear with Ju-88s & Bf 110s flying high to the rear monitoring the formations a directing attack approaches.
Having been down this road before, to not acknowledge the facts pertaining introduction of the G model in the fall of 1943 needs to be addressed. This was, by far, a time before the horrific loss rate of B-17 crews in the European air war began to moderate. Even after a long six months of missions with the B-17-G, relentless attacks from all directions continued. March saw 100's of Fortress losses . The 6th of March, 23 were shot down in 30 minutes with 69 destroyed and 102 seriously damaged for the day. Well into the Spring of 1944 the losses mounted. On 13th of April, the 1st BD's B-17's were sent for a 3rd mission to Schweinfurt. That day saw the entire 384th BG (eight B-17 G's) were shot down in a single pass of German fighters! The 29th of April : 17 Fortress's from the 4th CBW were shot down in 20 minutes. A total of 63 Eighth AF heavies for the day. By the end of April, 361 Heavies of the Eighth were lost. That's 3,600 crews killed or captured in one month!.
So on into May - with 35 lost on the 12th, 33 on the 24th and 34 on the 29th. By then the first B-17 G's were war weary. My mothers first husband was killed in B-17 G that was shot up by Fw 190's and exploded in the air near Paris in Feb 1944.
Sustained losses to flak were throughout the conflict into 1945.
It was not until the oil refineries and factories deep into the heart of Germany were destroyed 1944 that you could say the war was on its way to be won. The Luftwaffe even though greatly diminished continued to inflick periodic heavy losses.
"The Gs came out by the time the work had been done."
"I go back to, "the F won the war". All the Gs were left over because the fight had gone out of the Germans"
"Yeah there were some B-17Gs that managed to fly at the end of the war.
All I'm saying I want to see a jouneyman B-17F that carried the burden of the bombing.
Hey, I was around then and you kids have things screwed up beyond belief."
Veteran or not, to say that the B-17 G came in when it was a 'cake-walk' at the time is an insult to the thousands of brave airmen who died in from 1944 onwards.
Rick Spork
References:
B-17 Flying Fortess Units of the Eighth Air force
Pts I & 2
Martin Bowen
Osprey Publishing 2000 & 2002
Weapons of the Eighth Airforce
Frederick A. Johnsonson
MBI Publishing 2003
Jagwaffe Volume Five Section 1
Defending The Reich
Robert Forsyth & Eddie Creek
Ian Allan Publishing 2004
B-17's Over Berlin
Personal Stories from the 95th Bomb Group [H]
Ian L. Hawkins
Brassey's 1990
Oral Histories from
The 95th BG reunions 2003 -2005
In late 1942 the Luftwaffe under the savvy leadership of Adolf Galland issued the following directive:
a. The attack from the rear against a four engined bomber formation promises little success and almost always brings big losses. If an attack from the rear must be carried through it should be done from above or below and the fuel tanks and engines should be aiming points.
b. the attack from the sides can be effective but requires thorough training and good gunnery.
c. The attack from the front, front high, front low, all with low speed was the most effective of all. Flying ability, good aiming and closing up to the shortest possible range are the prerequisites for success.
d. The exit can be succeed only in a sharp turn in the direction of the bomber formation single bomber. The most important factor is the angle of bank with which the fighter leaves the bomber formation.
e. Basically the strongest weapon is the masses and repeated attack by an entire fighter formation such cases, the defensive fire can be weakened and the bomber formation be broken up.
This was a preferred attack by many of the experienced Luftwaffe pilots.
With unacceptable losses at the time the AAF needed some changes.
The XB-40, a modified B-17F, laden with heavy armament conducted firepower test with the AAF as early as 1942. Later Douglas built the YB-40 with a chin turret and staggered waist gun positions Twelve of the YB-40's flew combat with the 92nd BG between May & August of 1943. The gunships with up to 17,000 rounds of amunition were to act as a defensive curtain in the formations. They were slow and gas guzzlers. Although the test determined the plane was not practical as a standalone version the defensive test showed advantage of a chin turret was clearly a proven winner and a new series, labeled the B-17G went into production. The Bendix nose turret mounted two .50-cal. guns that relieved the Bombardier from the burden of a single center of the nose gun and all its bulk and clutter. He could easily switch from his primary duties to the IP and move to the swing out yoke control. The staggered waist gunner positions were incorporated too. This was considered by the crews an improvement despite a loss of top speed. The first G's were showing up in Sept-Oct 1943 with the Eighth AF. For the nose cabin crew the extra fire power was at least psychologically re-assuring when facing 20mm canon fire heading at them.
After the P-47 started an attrition rate of experienced Luftwaffe fighter pilots and the introduction of the G model, Galland reluctantly reversed directives in September 1943 . Now the primary attack was from the rear with Ju-88s & Bf 110s flying high to the rear monitoring the formations a directing attack approaches.
Having been down this road before, to not acknowledge the facts pertaining introduction of the G model in the fall of 1943 needs to be addressed. This was, by far, a time before the horrific loss rate of B-17 crews in the European air war began to moderate. Even after a long six months of missions with the B-17-G, relentless attacks from all directions continued. March saw 100's of Fortress losses . The 6th of March, 23 were shot down in 30 minutes with 69 destroyed and 102 seriously damaged for the day. Well into the Spring of 1944 the losses mounted. On 13th of April, the 1st BD's B-17's were sent for a 3rd mission to Schweinfurt. That day saw the entire 384th BG (eight B-17 G's) were shot down in a single pass of German fighters! The 29th of April : 17 Fortress's from the 4th CBW were shot down in 20 minutes. A total of 63 Eighth AF heavies for the day. By the end of April, 361 Heavies of the Eighth were lost. That's 3,600 crews killed or captured in one month!.
So on into May - with 35 lost on the 12th, 33 on the 24th and 34 on the 29th. By then the first B-17 G's were war weary. My mothers first husband was killed in B-17 G that was shot up by Fw 190's and exploded in the air near Paris in Feb 1944.
Sustained losses to flak were throughout the conflict into 1945.
It was not until the oil refineries and factories deep into the heart of Germany were destroyed 1944 that you could say the war was on its way to be won. The Luftwaffe even though greatly diminished continued to inflick periodic heavy losses.
"The Gs came out by the time the work had been done."
"I go back to, "the F won the war". All the Gs were left over because the fight had gone out of the Germans"
"Yeah there were some B-17Gs that managed to fly at the end of the war.
All I'm saying I want to see a jouneyman B-17F that carried the burden of the bombing.
Hey, I was around then and you kids have things screwed up beyond belief."
Veteran or not, to say that the B-17 G came in when it was a 'cake-walk' at the time is an insult to the thousands of brave airmen who died in from 1944 onwards.
Rick Spork
References:
B-17 Flying Fortess Units of the Eighth Air force
Pts I & 2
Martin Bowen
Osprey Publishing 2000 & 2002
Weapons of the Eighth Airforce
Frederick A. Johnsonson
MBI Publishing 2003
Jagwaffe Volume Five Section 1
Defending The Reich
Robert Forsyth & Eddie Creek
Ian Allan Publishing 2004
B-17's Over Berlin
Personal Stories from the 95th Bomb Group [H]
Ian L. Hawkins
Brassey's 1990
Oral Histories from
The 95th BG reunions 2003 -2005

