• There seems to be an uptick in Political comments in recent months. Those of us who are long time members of the site know that Political and Religious content has been banned for years. Nothing has changed. Please leave all political and religious comments out of the forums.

    If you recently joined the forums you were not presented with this restriction in the terms of service. This was due to a conversion error when we went from vBulletin to Xenforo. We have updated our terms of service to reflect these corrections.

    Please note any post refering to a politician will be considered political even if it is intended to be humor. Our experience is these topics have a way of dividing the forums and causing deep resentment among members. It is a poison to the community. We appreciate compliance with the rules.

    The Staff of SOH

  • Server side Maintenance is done. We still have an update to the forum software to run but that one will have to wait for a better time.

Boeing 777 down...

Bernt,

One of my best friends in life is an Air Force Lt. Col. who also is an ATP with American Airlines, and he did his master's thesis on the myriad of issues with Airbus design philosophy that has created situations already where automation could not be overriden by the PIC during an emergency situation. A Qantas Air flight experienced a situation where the systems kept trying to force dive a jet and the PIC had to wrestle the aircraft back under control multiple times and reported each time the jet's automation was literally fighting him doing this. And, he reported that he could not override the systems so that he could manually keep the jet on a safe attitude. He reported that he felt it was a very close call with him keeping the jet aloft and avoiding entering an unrecoverable unusual attitude.

Many experts have written that the recent Air France loss over the South Atlantic had its roots in the same issue. While I don't recall the exact situation, I remember there was another total loss with all souls onboard where accident investigators have reported the same issue may have caused that jet to be lost.

One of the factors behind USAF pilots favoring the Boeing design over the Airbus entry with regard to the replacement to the KC-135 was a view of the design of the automatic systems in the Airbus entry making it harder for pilots to perform manual maneuvers such as the emergency breakaway. That isn't speculation. I'm reporting what the AF pilots reported in their recommendations.

So, while I respect you tremendously and consider you a good friend, please don't try to assert that there are not documented concerns with regard to automation acting in manners that cannot be overriden by pilots. I respect you if you disagree and believe it remains your right to disagree. But, there are a lot of professional pilots who have carefully studied this issue and reached the same conclusion I have reached that already we have airliner designs that have put the automation at too high a pyramid where pilots cannot override them when it is deemed the automation is causing a risk of mishap.

Respectfully submitted,

Ken
 
4. How much do you think we use AP and A/T during the semi-annual simulator checks? I doubt than too many GA or corporate pilots would be able to fly a non-precision approach with a crippled airliner on one engine, with 2 inop hydraulic systems, followed by a circling approach in heavy rain with a 15kts crosswind.

I suggest taking a look at the checkride criteria for an FAA commercial and an FAA Airline Transport Pilot practical checkride and see what the actual differences are. They are not that big, and so with the proper training (meaning the same as you get for your type checkride) I would be less inclined to draw that conclusion. I know in my AMEL commercial practical examination, I had to perform a simulated critical engine out instrument approach flown under the hood to minimums. I don't think I would have passed if I didn't perform it accurately.

I would also suggest that since Cat III ILS coupling requirements specify vertical and localizer active AP guidance on final approach, that since most all GA and corporate jets lack this, that the use of AP during IAP's is significantly higher for ATP's. While I don't draw that as a qualitative difference between pilots, I will say that it's the expressed view of the ALPA that airline pilots are not being allowed sufficient opportunities to practice their manual flying skills. Clearly, this therefore isn't an observation limited to a commercial pilot who also happens to be a USAF instructor pilot who also happens to teach Instrument Refresher plus Crew Resource Management, and has logged several thousand PIC hours himself.

I know I greatly respect your professional credentials and experience. I hope you respect mine. But, with a comment like that, I start to wonder!

BTW: I have flown circle approaches at night, at minimums, with 15 knot crosswinds with my wife and children onboard.

Ken
 

Yep, that's exactly what I thought when I first read about it today. Go after all the "deep" pockets and see what can be scraped out! Frankly, the inflatable slides aren't designed to work after a pilot has twice pile drived the jet into the ground, sheared off all the landing gear, both engines, and scraped off nearly the entire lower third of the fuselage along the runway! To think that all but two of the slides worked perfectly after that is a good result for the jet!

I would have hoped that even in this litigation crazed world we live in that the surviving passengers could have appreciated that the jet was abused beyond all design and all but three passengers survived. Plus, I haven't read anything from the NTSB that indicates a systems malfunction. I can see suing the airline a bit, but their insurance will already take care of any and all medical costs.

Ken
 
Back
Top