06/03/42
Eleventh AF
June 3
Japanese carrierbased bmrs and ftrs bomb and strafe Ft Mears and Dutch Harbor in several waves inflicting little damage and killing 52 US personnel. P-40's from Cold Bay trying to intercept them arrive 10 min after the last attack wave departs. Other P-40's at Umnak are notified too late due to communication failure. 9 P-40's and 6 B-26's fly patrol but cannot find the fleet--180 mi S of Dutch Harbor--but 2 of the P-40's engage 4 carrier-based aircraft, shoot down one and damage another.
June 4
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06/04/42 [/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Eleventh AF[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]A carrier-borne force strikes again as 11 bmrs, 10 ftrs, and 8 torpedo bmrs attack Dutch Harbor in several waves. 2 P-40's intercept 4 bmrs just before noon over Umnak Pass and shoot down 3. During the afternoon P-40's intercept 9 ftrs. A dogfight claims one enemy aircraft and one P-40, the Eleventh's first combat casualty. AA fire claims another Japanese bmr. During the afternoon 2 B-17's and 5 B-26's attack the carrier force, and 3 more B-26's strike the cruiser Takao. No hits are scored. 1 B-24 and 1 B-25 fail to return.[/FONT]
this was the offical US Airforce report from their history. There appears to be some disagreement from other sources, other sources say:
After the first raid, During the search, the four Type-95 two-seat recon planes launched from the cruisers Takao and Maya, encountered U.S. fighters searching for the departing Japanese squadron and shot two of them down, while damaging the other two, which managed to return to their ships, only to crash-land in the water, but the crews of both were rescued. So this report credits two downed planes.
after the second raid, the Japanese forces were returning to their ships, when....
On the way back, the Japanese planes encountered an air patrol of P-40 fighters over Otter Point and an aerial combat ensued in which one fighter and two level bombers were lost, but four out of the six U.S. fighters were lost as well.
As for the Raids themselves, the details were:
June 3, 1942
At dawn, which at 2:58 AM given the geographic latitude and longitude, Kakuta ordered his carriers to launch their strike which was made up of 12 fighters, 10 high-level bombers, and 12 dive bombers that took off from the two small carriers in the freezing weather to strike at Dutch Harbor. The planes arrived over Dutch Harbor at 4:07 AM, and attacked the town's radio station and oil storage tanks causing some damage.
June 4, 1942
On the second day, the Japanese carriers sailed to less than 100 miles south of Dutch Harbor to launch a second attack. At 4:00 PM on June 4 a second airstrike of nine fighters, 11 dive bombers, and six level bombers took off and less than an hour later attacked the U.S. facilities at Dutch Harbor again. More targets were damaged including some grounded aircraft, army barracks, oil storage tanks, aircraft hangers, and a few merchant ships in the port. Again no Japanese aircraft were lost at Dutch Harbor, but two dive bombers and one fighter, damaged by anti-aircraft fire, failed to return to their carriers.
A Official US Army brochure on the Aleutians and WWII says:
Because U.S. intelligence had broken the Japanese naval code, Admiral Nimitz had learned by 21 May of Yamamoto's plans, including the Aleutian diversion, the strength of both Yamamoto's and Hosogaya's fleets, and that Hosogaya would open the fight on 1 June or shortly thereafter. Nimitz decided to confront both enemy fleets, retaining his three aircraft carriers for the Midway battle while sending a third of his surface fleet (Task Force 8) under Rear Adm. Robert A. Theobald to defend Alaska. Theobald was ordered to hold Dutch Harbor, a small naval facility in the eastern Aleutians, at all costs and to prevent the Japanese from gaining a foothold in Alaska.
Theobald's task force of 5 cruisers, 14 destroyers, and 6 submarines quietly left Pearl Harbor on 25 May to take a position in the Alaskan Sea 400 miles off Kodiak Island, there to wait for the arrival of Hosogaya's fleet. In the meantime Theobald established his headquarters on Kodiak and met with Maj. Gen. (later Lt. Gen.) Simon B. Buckner, Jr., the commander of the Army's Alaska Defense Command.
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Command authority in the North Pacific Area was divided and cumbersome. Upon reaching Alaska, Theobald became commander of all Allied naval and air forces, authority over the ground forces, which remained under Buckner, with whom he was to work in a spirit of "mutual cooperation." While Theobald reported directly to Admiral Nimitz as his agent in the North Pacific Area, Buckner answered to the commander of the San Francisco-based Western Defense Command, Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt, who was responsible for the defense of Alaska and western Canada. Any differences between Nimitz and DeWitt in the North Pacific Area would be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in Washington for resolution.
As of 1 June 1942, American military strength in Alaska stood at 45,000 men, with about 13,000 at Cold Bay (Fort Randall) on the tip of the Alaskan Peninsula and at two Aleutian bases: the naval facility at Dutch Harbor on Unalaska Island, 200 miles west of Cold Bay, and a recently built Army air base (Fort Glenn) 70 miles west of the naval station on Umnak Island. Army strength, less air force personnel, at those three bases totaled no more than 2,300, composed mainly of infantry, field and antiaircraft artillery troops, and a large construction engineer contingent, which had been rushed to the construction of bases.
On Theobald's arrival at Kodiak, he assumed control of the U.S. Army Air Corps' Eleventh Air Force, commanded by Brig. Gen. (later Maj. Gen.) William C. Butler. This force consisted of 10 heavy and 34 medium bombers and 95 fighters, divided between its main base, Elmendorf Airfield, in Anchorage, and at airfields at Cold Bay and on Umnak. Theobald charged Butler to locate the Japanese fleet reported heading toward Dutch Harbor and attack it with his bombers, concentrating on sinking Hosogaya's 2 aircraft carriers. Once the enemy planes were removed, Task Force 8 would engage the enemy fleet and destroy it.
On the afternoon of 2 June a naval patrol plane spotted the approaching enemy fleet, reporting its location as 800 miles southwest of Dutch Harbor. Theobald placed his entire command on full alert. Shortly thereafter bad weather set in, and no further sightings of the fleet were made that day.
Early the next morning, despite dense fog and rough seas, Hosogaya launched some of his aircraft to attack Dutch Harbor. Only half reached their objective. The rest either became lost in the fog and darkness and crashed into the sea or returned to their carriers. In all, seventeen planes found the naval base, the first arriving at 0545. As the Japanese pilots looked for targets to engage, they came under intense antiaircraft fire and soon found themselves confronted by U.S.
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Buildings burning after the first enemy attack on Dutch Harbor, 3 June 1942. (DA photograph)
fighter planes sent from Fort Glenn on Umnak Island. Startled by the American response, they quickly released their bombs, made a cursory strafing run, and left to return to their carriers. As a result of their haste they did little damage to the base. But Hosogaya's fleet remained unlocated, and the U.S. planes based at Cold Harbor had received no word of the attack because of a communications failure.
The next day the Japanese returned to Dutch Harbor. This time the enemy pilots were better organized and better prepared. When the attack finally ended that afternoon, the base's oil storage tanks were ablaze, part of the hospital was demolished, and a beached barracks ship was damaged. Although American pilots had finally located the Japanese carriers, attempts to destroy them proved fruitless. As bad weather again set in, all contact with the enemy fleet was lost. In all, the Japanese raid claimed 43 U.S. lives, of which 33 were soldiers. Another 64 Americans were wounded. Eleven U.S. planes were downed, while the Japanese lost ten aircraft.
http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/aleut/aleut.htm
http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/aleut/almap1-t.jpg