I agree,in simple terms that's why they pay the big bucks.You are in charge and good,bad or indifferent it's on your head as captain.From what I am reading this whole thing could have been brought to a screaming halt if the switch had been thrown immediately instead of waiting for orders from higher up.Please correct me if I am wrong on that.
Nope, you are right, based again on the comments of the surviving rig workers. The switch was thrown too late and it seemed by the time it was thrown, the damage from the fire prevented it from functioning as designed. That delay appears the direct result of overly centralized management structure. The supervisors in charge simply assumed that they would always have time to get everyone out of bed or out of the shower to assemble, meet, discuss, and implement a plan at their leisure. However, common sense dictated it was negligent to have no immediate action plan in effect.
There should have been one man on duty, and in immediate proximity to the critical switch, given authority to engage it under emergency situation without any requirement to coordinate. This is called a critical action, and in the military when you have a critical single point of failure action that must be implemented in a timely manner, you have a known and unified chain of command to implement immediately by trusted officers on scene.
And the concept of on scene command is imperative. It's like in the Navy, the senior officer on the bridge, regardless of rank, is in command and is empowered with critical decision making authority. When the captain arrives on the bridge, he gets a quick update and assumes command. But, until then, the senior officer on the bridge is every bit in command and has authority to act.
A few weeks back I held judgment, but as I keep reading these first hand accounts it makes me angrier and angrier. I see incompetence among the senior leadership of BP and Transocean, who were responsible for these men and they failed to do what was required. They hesititated to implement the safety protocols until too late to prevent tragedy and then when they did act it resembled amateur hour. Those who survived appeared to survive because some people acted on their own authority. They compounded this systemic incompetence with additional decisions made against the urgings of Transocean and Halliburton experts to substitute sea water for heavy mud which likely reduced the time margin otherwise available when this gas pocket let loose. Yes, it was likely a very powerful gas pocket, but these things have happened before. That's why the safety protocols were in place.
The hell of it is that had someone summoned the courage to bypass the rules and press the switch, he would have prevented disaster, but some corporate suit would have fired him for violating their standing rules! Since that did not happen, these same suits are walling up their public relations disaster effort. But, this one's too large.
They look stupid and negligent because that's what they were!
And good men died because of it!
Ken
