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The Staff of SOH
Gettysburg
- Thread starter OBIO
- Start date
TeaSea
SOH-CM-2014
Ken, you're absolutely right, everyone who has the chance should see the battlefield at Gettysburg. For one, it's one of the few battlefields that you can actually see everything as it actually was...well, except for the monuments. It's also one you can tour in a day to get the highpoints. And frankly, it's a pretty part of the country.
However, your comment on Little Round Top is almost exactly what one of my fellow officers said when we were touring the battlefield as part of an Armed Forces Staff College staff ride. Understand, this man was a senior Army officer, and his remark was "Lee was insane to send men up this hill, you can see just by standing here how stupid that was" (or words to that effect). Of course, as our guide and instructor simply pointed out....."Lee, nor anyone in the Confederate force....ever stood on that hill, their view was somewhat different.".
And no one's answered my challenge about Friday Harbor...
Navy Chief
Senior Member
I added Gettysburg to my Netflix list, earlier today...........................
NC
NC
K
Ken Stallings
Guest
Lee might have had that excuse for Little Round Top. But for Pickett's Charge, Longstreet gave him as sobering and accurate advice as a subordinate can provide.
Cheers,
Ken
K
Ken Stallings
Guest
Various sources point to various counseling sessions between Lee and Stewart. However, I liked that scene a lot for a few reasons. First, Lee had a temper and it could boil up into a pure rage. Lee worked very hard to tamp it down tight.
One historical period source said the session was in broad daylight upon Stewart's typical return with pomp and circumstance, announcing to Lee, "General Lee, I offer you XX wagons!" Normally, captured Union supply wagons were invaluable. Lee's terse reply was, "General, they are more of a burden to me now!"
It is said that simple cold retort froze Stewart stiff with shock and humiliation!
Ken
K
Ken Stallings
Guest
I think OBIO has nailed something though....
These are only movies you watch when the wife is away!
Oh, BTW, Friday Harbor is a popular destination both in the real world and in FS9 and FSX.
What's it's connection with the Battle of Gettysburg?
In June of 1859, a young Army officer by the name of George Pickett led a small group of detached US Army soldiers to the region to protect Americans living there. There was a serious despute between the British owned Hudson Bay Company and the group of American settlers living there.
Cheers,
Ken
Snuffy
Happiness Consultant
Longstreet's "problem" at the time of Gettysburg, was that he had become taken with the idea that on a defensive situation his corps was unbeatable and he had developed that strategy that he wanted to fight Gettysburg as a defensive battle. Where the Confederates occupied Seminary Ridge and let the Yanks come to them.
Unfortunately, Lee wasn't in the mood to agree with Longstreet in July.
Unfortunately, Lee wasn't in the mood to agree with Longstreet in July.
TeaSea
SOH-CM-2014
Bingo!
K
Ken Stallings
Guest
But most ironically of all, Lee never again ordered a Napoleanic charge. After he killed a part of his army truly irreplacable, he then fought the precise style of battle Longstreet wanted him to. Now, imagine the full corps worth of troops Lee destroyed at Gettysburg being available in the defense of Richmond!
Worse, little reported fact is that after Gettysburg the Army of Northern Virginia saw the onset of continuous dessertions, and the flow continued until it reached crises during the Petersburg seige.
In short, at Gettysburg, Lee enjoyed total support and confidence from his men. After Gettysburg, most of the soldiers believed the war was lost and had serious concerns. Longstreet's desire wasn't pure static defensive warfare. He believed in mobile defense, using your outnumbered forces to maneuver in such a manner as to force the enemy to attack on a prepared position you held.
Frederecksburg and Chacellorsville were the two best examples that Lee allowed. Longstreet fought another one in his very successful campaigns in the Shenandoa and also in the Tennessee Campaign. Further, before he was severely wounded (ironically as Jackson by his own men!) Longstreet lead one of the most original and innovative applications of tactics at Second Wliderness. Longstreet had an entire corps fight in extended skirmish lines, which rolled up the opposing forces of General Winfield Scott Hancock, in his own words, "like a wet blanket!"
In my read of Civil War generals, therre are only two corps level commanders who I think had war-winning strategies -- Sherman and Longstreet. Of the two, Sherman received total support from his superiors. Longstreet at best received spotty support and at the most critical point of the war, was essentially rebuked and forced to lead his men to anticipated disaster.
Further, Gettysburg wasn't the first disaster for Lee's generalship. Read about Malvern Hill early in the war. Lee sent wave after wave of Napoleonic assaults on prepared Union positions and suffered gut wrenching casualties for the effort.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Malvern_Hill
Lee should have learned then that Napoleonic tactics against the weapons of the day was disaster incarnate. For him to apply the same failed forumula at Gettysburg was pure insanity. If Lee faced any general other than the woeful George McClellan that day, the war would have ended in Union victory in Virginia right then! Little Mac literally conceded defeat to a defeated foe!
When a general goes into a war knowing the mathematics that his enemy outnumbers him in forces at least four to one, and likely worse depending upon level of mobilization, he simply must adopt a strategic vision that conserves his forces through application of defensive maneuver warfare.
To sum up, only two corps commanders of that war are today considered modern thinkers, and again they are Sherman and Longstreet.
Ken
Cazzie
SOH-CM-2024
Ken,
I have visited the battlegrounds of Malvern Hill and Cold Harbor. Walk all about what is left of Fort Harisson. Been all over Richmond and Petersburg ACW battlefields.
But Malvern Hill was the Confederate's Batte of the Coral Sea, Gettysburg was their Midway. Malvern Hill was the first truly crushing defeat for the Confederacy.
Agree about Longstreet and Sherman, but I still spit on the ground the latter walked on.
Caz
I have visited the battlegrounds of Malvern Hill and Cold Harbor. Walk all about what is left of Fort Harisson. Been all over Richmond and Petersburg ACW battlefields.
But Malvern Hill was the Confederate's Batte of the Coral Sea, Gettysburg was their Midway. Malvern Hill was the first truly crushing defeat for the Confederacy.
Agree about Longstreet and Sherman, but I still spit on the ground the latter walked on.
Caz
Snuffy
Happiness Consultant
Ken, With regard to your comments concerning Malvern Hill. (Having lived in Richmond/Mechanicsville and traipsed all over that area more times than I can count, and being a huge ACW buff ... )
Please note that, the battle of Malvern Hill was only the 6th or 7th battle the "Army of Northern Virginia" fought as a cognitive group. Prior to the Defense of Richmond in 1862, the South did not "own" an "Army" per rights of a definition of an Army, and at that time the Corps was not in use by the Confederate forces. The Division was the largest of Military organizations permitted by Confederate law at the time.
Lee was just given overall command of all the division commanders, just prior to the defense of Richmond in 1862, so in essence the "Army" that fought at Malvern Hill was not the same "army" that fought at Gettysburg.
And the point of the "Napoleonic Style" of charges used at Malvern Hill is not what was prescribed by the Commanding General. No, but he wanted a united front of all the divisions to attack at the same time. Unfortunately due to the Divisions not having had enough time to work with each other, nor no one having a familiarity with the terrain of the area, a breakdown in communications (not enough trained staff,) not to mention the denseness of the underbrush and swampiness of the area that prohibited proper movement of troops, the divisions could not and did not work in conjunction with each other in making the assault on Malvern Hill.
But in their behalf, the troops that did make the charges have to be given credit for facing ridiculous odds and yet trying to carrying out their commanding general's wishes.
Also recall, though not as desperate as times got in 1864, but in 1862, there was a desperation by the Southern forces to push the Yankee invaders from before their beloved capital city. And at this juncture, after McClellan had managed to get within 5 - 8 miles of the city proper, any assault against the foe was necessary to repel him and drive him away from before the city.
Of course in McClellan's case, it was never that difficult as McClellan always believed that his forces were underdogs in this campaign, choosing to believe Pinkerton's reports that the Confederates had twice as many troops as McClellan had.
In retrospect, we can safely sit in our armchairs and debate the attack at Malvern Hill and wag our heads at the seeming waste of life in that battle, but in the day and time of that fight, attacking and trying to drive the enemy from before their capital city was of prime motive of the Confederate forces. They did what had to be done.
With the conflict at Gettysburg, the Army of Northern Virgina was a different critter. It had come into its own, it had a proper organization, unfortunately the one general that could have made a difference in that battle had died a couple months before this battle took place, Unfortunately, Early wasn't the man that should have been put in charge of Jackson's Corps. Early vacillated when he should have been more aggressive.
Jackson was always the more aggressive of the corps commanders, and it wasn't until after Jackson's death that the ANV was organized into 3 corps. Until then, it was just Longstreet and Jackson. (Lee's Left and Right hands respectively, said so by Lee himself.)
There were many mistakes made at Gettysburg, (that's easy enough to see in hindsight today,) however at the time, Stuart was out doing his thing behind the Army of the Potomac when he should have been closer to the ANV and providing eyes and ears for Lee. IF Stuart would have been where he should have been, Lee would have known that there was a minimal force before him at Gettysburg, and Gettysburg could have become another name synonymous with just a skirmish instead of the waterloo of the Confederacy.
Again, on the first day at Gettysburg as at Malvern Hill, the Confederate forces were spread out, Lee didn't know where they all were, and most importantly, and unlike Malvern Hill, he had no idea what forces were before him at Gettysburg.
I'm sure if Lee knew it was only a division of Cavalry in front of him, then he probably would have unleashed all of A.P. Hills Corps on Buford's horse men. Once they were routed, Gettysburg could have easily been taken by the ANV and the ending could have been different.
So in armchair generalizing, the blame could be placed on at least 3 of Lee's subordinates for the failure of Gettysburg. Stuart (primarily), Early and then Longstreet.
Believe it or not, Lee always had the total support of his men. I suggest you read about the reaction of the men who remained of the ANV at Appomattox, after Lee met with Grant. At one point these men, though few, ragged, and worn out, vowed to Lee, that if he would just say the word, they would rise up and assail the union forces surrounding them. They retained that fighting spirit.
Those that did dessert, I will not call cowards. Those that deserted were men who were stressed by such things as what siege warfare will do to an individual, letters from home with the wifes telling of how bad things were so their duty to family superseded duty to country. Be assured that once these folks had the situation at home taken care of, they would have returned to the numbers of the ANV, unfortunately, the end was quick in coming before they could get back to their duty.
It always amazes me to read about certain battles where numbers are listed. For example, with the battle of Sharpsburg, (Antietam,) Lee had 55,000 men ... after the battle the ANV had 31 percent losses knocking the force to around 44,500 men, yet, at Gettysburg the ANV claimed up wards of 65,000 - 70,000 men. Where did they all come from? Returning convalescents, new recruits, stragglers, and AWOLs.
IF Grant would have left Lee alone long enough, the Ranks of the ANV would have refilled. Perhaps not to the numbers they use to be, but I assure you, it would have been far more than the 28,000 or so that surrended that day.
Here's a bit of trivia ...
The ACW is known as the war that started in some guy's front yard and ended in his back yard. Why is that?
Please note that, the battle of Malvern Hill was only the 6th or 7th battle the "Army of Northern Virginia" fought as a cognitive group. Prior to the Defense of Richmond in 1862, the South did not "own" an "Army" per rights of a definition of an Army, and at that time the Corps was not in use by the Confederate forces. The Division was the largest of Military organizations permitted by Confederate law at the time.
Lee was just given overall command of all the division commanders, just prior to the defense of Richmond in 1862, so in essence the "Army" that fought at Malvern Hill was not the same "army" that fought at Gettysburg.
And the point of the "Napoleonic Style" of charges used at Malvern Hill is not what was prescribed by the Commanding General. No, but he wanted a united front of all the divisions to attack at the same time. Unfortunately due to the Divisions not having had enough time to work with each other, nor no one having a familiarity with the terrain of the area, a breakdown in communications (not enough trained staff,) not to mention the denseness of the underbrush and swampiness of the area that prohibited proper movement of troops, the divisions could not and did not work in conjunction with each other in making the assault on Malvern Hill.
But in their behalf, the troops that did make the charges have to be given credit for facing ridiculous odds and yet trying to carrying out their commanding general's wishes.
Also recall, though not as desperate as times got in 1864, but in 1862, there was a desperation by the Southern forces to push the Yankee invaders from before their beloved capital city. And at this juncture, after McClellan had managed to get within 5 - 8 miles of the city proper, any assault against the foe was necessary to repel him and drive him away from before the city.
Of course in McClellan's case, it was never that difficult as McClellan always believed that his forces were underdogs in this campaign, choosing to believe Pinkerton's reports that the Confederates had twice as many troops as McClellan had.
In retrospect, we can safely sit in our armchairs and debate the attack at Malvern Hill and wag our heads at the seeming waste of life in that battle, but in the day and time of that fight, attacking and trying to drive the enemy from before their capital city was of prime motive of the Confederate forces. They did what had to be done.
With the conflict at Gettysburg, the Army of Northern Virgina was a different critter. It had come into its own, it had a proper organization, unfortunately the one general that could have made a difference in that battle had died a couple months before this battle took place, Unfortunately, Early wasn't the man that should have been put in charge of Jackson's Corps. Early vacillated when he should have been more aggressive.
Jackson was always the more aggressive of the corps commanders, and it wasn't until after Jackson's death that the ANV was organized into 3 corps. Until then, it was just Longstreet and Jackson. (Lee's Left and Right hands respectively, said so by Lee himself.)
There were many mistakes made at Gettysburg, (that's easy enough to see in hindsight today,) however at the time, Stuart was out doing his thing behind the Army of the Potomac when he should have been closer to the ANV and providing eyes and ears for Lee. IF Stuart would have been where he should have been, Lee would have known that there was a minimal force before him at Gettysburg, and Gettysburg could have become another name synonymous with just a skirmish instead of the waterloo of the Confederacy.
Again, on the first day at Gettysburg as at Malvern Hill, the Confederate forces were spread out, Lee didn't know where they all were, and most importantly, and unlike Malvern Hill, he had no idea what forces were before him at Gettysburg.
I'm sure if Lee knew it was only a division of Cavalry in front of him, then he probably would have unleashed all of A.P. Hills Corps on Buford's horse men. Once they were routed, Gettysburg could have easily been taken by the ANV and the ending could have been different.
So in armchair generalizing, the blame could be placed on at least 3 of Lee's subordinates for the failure of Gettysburg. Stuart (primarily), Early and then Longstreet.
Believe it or not, Lee always had the total support of his men. I suggest you read about the reaction of the men who remained of the ANV at Appomattox, after Lee met with Grant. At one point these men, though few, ragged, and worn out, vowed to Lee, that if he would just say the word, they would rise up and assail the union forces surrounding them. They retained that fighting spirit.
Those that did dessert, I will not call cowards. Those that deserted were men who were stressed by such things as what siege warfare will do to an individual, letters from home with the wifes telling of how bad things were so their duty to family superseded duty to country. Be assured that once these folks had the situation at home taken care of, they would have returned to the numbers of the ANV, unfortunately, the end was quick in coming before they could get back to their duty.
It always amazes me to read about certain battles where numbers are listed. For example, with the battle of Sharpsburg, (Antietam,) Lee had 55,000 men ... after the battle the ANV had 31 percent losses knocking the force to around 44,500 men, yet, at Gettysburg the ANV claimed up wards of 65,000 - 70,000 men. Where did they all come from? Returning convalescents, new recruits, stragglers, and AWOLs.
IF Grant would have left Lee alone long enough, the Ranks of the ANV would have refilled. Perhaps not to the numbers they use to be, but I assure you, it would have been far more than the 28,000 or so that surrended that day.
Here's a bit of trivia ...
The ACW is known as the war that started in some guy's front yard and ended in his back yard. Why is that?
Snuffy
Happiness Consultant
There were a mess of other factors at Gettysburg too that accounted for the loss. Among them was the fact that Lee wasn't as healthy as he could have been, its been recorded that he was suffering from a cold or something that detracted from his otherwise clear headed thinking.
Physical factors played against the Confederacy too. Unlike most other battles that the South had won, this time the situation was reversed. The Union had the shorter interior lines of defense to its benefit and the Rebs had the longer exterior lines. The Yankees were better able to send unused forces to areas of concern quicker because of that.
That fact for the Yankees, and Longstreet's, vacillating on the second day prevented the Confederates from taking Little and Big Round Tops. Lee initially ordered Longstreet at 8:00 A.M. to take the hills, but he waffled around until after 12 or so ... giving plenty of time for Meade to react to strengthening his left on the hills.
And what ultimately led to Lee's greatest blunder in strategy, Pickett's Charge, was due to the foggy head he had from his cold medicines. His reasoning being, on day one he attacked an unknown force and didn't press the issue, when he had clear superiority of men. Buford only had 20,000 Cavalry, Lee had 2/3rds of Hill's Corps at his disposal, More than twice what Buford had, plus several batteries of artillery.
On day two, Lee attacked first one flank (their left, the union right at Culp's Hill ...) and due to the halfhearted effort by Early, it was more a blood bath than anything successful. Also during that attack, Longstreet was supposed to have attacked the Round Tops, but because he didn't want to have an offensive battle dillydallied until it was too late and his forces were repulsed as well, the union being able to take advantage of their shorter interior lines of communications.
On day three, Lee's foggy mind told him that since he had already attacked both flanks and lost, then the center of the union line had to be the weakest and that's what precipitated Pickett's Charge. Again an Effort entrusted to Longstreet who wanted a defensive battle and not an offensive one and so left all the matters of detailing that charge to Pickett as opposed to handling it himself.
As it was, the whole days actions were off as well. It was a battle that never should have been fought.
Physical factors played against the Confederacy too. Unlike most other battles that the South had won, this time the situation was reversed. The Union had the shorter interior lines of defense to its benefit and the Rebs had the longer exterior lines. The Yankees were better able to send unused forces to areas of concern quicker because of that.
That fact for the Yankees, and Longstreet's, vacillating on the second day prevented the Confederates from taking Little and Big Round Tops. Lee initially ordered Longstreet at 8:00 A.M. to take the hills, but he waffled around until after 12 or so ... giving plenty of time for Meade to react to strengthening his left on the hills.
And what ultimately led to Lee's greatest blunder in strategy, Pickett's Charge, was due to the foggy head he had from his cold medicines. His reasoning being, on day one he attacked an unknown force and didn't press the issue, when he had clear superiority of men. Buford only had 20,000 Cavalry, Lee had 2/3rds of Hill's Corps at his disposal, More than twice what Buford had, plus several batteries of artillery.
On day two, Lee attacked first one flank (their left, the union right at Culp's Hill ...) and due to the halfhearted effort by Early, it was more a blood bath than anything successful. Also during that attack, Longstreet was supposed to have attacked the Round Tops, but because he didn't want to have an offensive battle dillydallied until it was too late and his forces were repulsed as well, the union being able to take advantage of their shorter interior lines of communications.
On day three, Lee's foggy mind told him that since he had already attacked both flanks and lost, then the center of the union line had to be the weakest and that's what precipitated Pickett's Charge. Again an Effort entrusted to Longstreet who wanted a defensive battle and not an offensive one and so left all the matters of detailing that charge to Pickett as opposed to handling it himself.
As it was, the whole days actions were off as well. It was a battle that never should have been fought.
TeaSea
SOH-CM-2014
Perhaps it was not of either sides choosing, but looking at the terrain, the roads, and Lee's objective of assaulting or even taking Harrisburg, it was inevitable that the battle occur either at Gettysburg, Carlisle, York, or some other location in the South Mountain Area where the road junctions came together.
Lee's aggressive move into Pennsylvania (still controversial to Southerners who did not believe in invading the North) meant the the AOP had to move North, and necessarily place themselves between Lee and the Potomac (and Wash D.C.).
This, of course, is exactly what Lee wanted. He wanted to lure the AOP north...he wanted his Cannae. And after the first day of Gettysburg, it was completely reasonable for him to think he had it in his grasp.
Longstreet gets a lot of abuse at the outcome of this battle, but I suspect most of that came due to politics after the war, rather than the actual battle. Longstreet, who Lee never lost faith in, quickly reconciled with the North after the war, and was accused of being a traitor by many of his former peers. Their post war writing is quite vicious....and coincides with Longstreet's joining the Republican Party. It's from this time period that the blame gets to be pushed at Longstreet rather than at Lee. But let's be clear....this was Lee's battle, his campaign, and he lost it. He himself never seemed to play the "what if" game, never denied his responsibility, and accepted the defeat as God's will. His retreat from Gettysburg is an exceptional maneuver, however it's often overlooked being overshadowed by the battle itself.
Incidentally, Longstreet shares that political vitriol with John Mosby, who also came under similar abuse. Mosby (of Mosby's raiders) owns the distinction of being the last Confederate officer to formally surrender, and one of the first to join the Republicans. He later became Ambassador to China (appointed by U.S. Grant, who he became fast friends with), and was a key player in over-hauling the Civil Service system in the U.S. after the scandals of the Grant administration, throwing out the previous "spoils" system.
I've also walked the battlefield at Cold Harbor...which due to it's size (what the Parks Department owns anyway) you can do in about 20 minutes. I'm not totally sure, but I believe Cold Harbor holds the record for the most American blood spilled in the shortest amount of time...allegedly over 6000 men cut down in 15 minutes (the majority of them would die). This time, it was Meade (as ordered by Grant) who assaulted Lee's prepared defenses.
Grant himself said that assault is one of the few he ever regrets ordering.
Lee's aggressive move into Pennsylvania (still controversial to Southerners who did not believe in invading the North) meant the the AOP had to move North, and necessarily place themselves between Lee and the Potomac (and Wash D.C.).
This, of course, is exactly what Lee wanted. He wanted to lure the AOP north...he wanted his Cannae. And after the first day of Gettysburg, it was completely reasonable for him to think he had it in his grasp.
Longstreet gets a lot of abuse at the outcome of this battle, but I suspect most of that came due to politics after the war, rather than the actual battle. Longstreet, who Lee never lost faith in, quickly reconciled with the North after the war, and was accused of being a traitor by many of his former peers. Their post war writing is quite vicious....and coincides with Longstreet's joining the Republican Party. It's from this time period that the blame gets to be pushed at Longstreet rather than at Lee. But let's be clear....this was Lee's battle, his campaign, and he lost it. He himself never seemed to play the "what if" game, never denied his responsibility, and accepted the defeat as God's will. His retreat from Gettysburg is an exceptional maneuver, however it's often overlooked being overshadowed by the battle itself.
Incidentally, Longstreet shares that political vitriol with John Mosby, who also came under similar abuse. Mosby (of Mosby's raiders) owns the distinction of being the last Confederate officer to formally surrender, and one of the first to join the Republicans. He later became Ambassador to China (appointed by U.S. Grant, who he became fast friends with), and was a key player in over-hauling the Civil Service system in the U.S. after the scandals of the Grant administration, throwing out the previous "spoils" system.
I've also walked the battlefield at Cold Harbor...which due to it's size (what the Parks Department owns anyway) you can do in about 20 minutes. I'm not totally sure, but I believe Cold Harbor holds the record for the most American blood spilled in the shortest amount of time...allegedly over 6000 men cut down in 15 minutes (the majority of them would die). This time, it was Meade (as ordered by Grant) who assaulted Lee's prepared defenses.
Grant himself said that assault is one of the few he ever regrets ordering.
K
Ken Stallings
Guest
Longstreet attacked later than ideally planned because of the poor reconnasaince of the planned route of march. It was supposed to be done without the Union troops observing it, else with their interior lines Meade's forces could have massed more troops than any number the Confederates massed for the attack.
So, halfway into the march, Longstreet clearly observed Union troops, which of course meant the Union troops observed his march. Longstreet made the only rational move, a reverse march once an alternate route that was hidden was found.
Some have postulated that Longstreet could have simply moved a bit further down the hill and off the road to hid his forces. They point out that a small group had before done this. What they ignored is that Longstreet had to also move his artillery and that field below the hill was very muddy from recent rains.
The best chance the Confederates had to win that grand victory they desires was if Ewell had siezed Culps Hill as Lee wanted him to do. As opposed to the irascible Jubal Early, Ewell at least admitted that his critical mistake was the pivot point. Early concocted the post-war fiction that Longstreet was supposed to attack at a set time in the early morning. This was not true. Lee gave general orders without a hard timetable. The key was to coordinate the attack on day two on both flanks.
What upset that plan, wasn't Longstreet's reverse march to avoid detection. Rather, Ewell's forces suffered a Union attack as they readied for their own assault.
Ken
So, halfway into the march, Longstreet clearly observed Union troops, which of course meant the Union troops observed his march. Longstreet made the only rational move, a reverse march once an alternate route that was hidden was found.
Some have postulated that Longstreet could have simply moved a bit further down the hill and off the road to hid his forces. They point out that a small group had before done this. What they ignored is that Longstreet had to also move his artillery and that field below the hill was very muddy from recent rains.
The best chance the Confederates had to win that grand victory they desires was if Ewell had siezed Culps Hill as Lee wanted him to do. As opposed to the irascible Jubal Early, Ewell at least admitted that his critical mistake was the pivot point. Early concocted the post-war fiction that Longstreet was supposed to attack at a set time in the early morning. This was not true. Lee gave general orders without a hard timetable. The key was to coordinate the attack on day two on both flanks.
What upset that plan, wasn't Longstreet's reverse march to avoid detection. Rather, Ewell's forces suffered a Union attack as they readied for their own assault.
Ken
Because the First Battle of Bull Run (or First Manassas) was fought near Wilmer McClain's (check spelling) property, after which he relocated to be out of the way of the fighting, only to have the Army of Northern Virginia surrender ceremony signed at his house. Please correct me if I'm wrong.
JAMES
Ken,
Have you read Robert Leckie's (yes, the same Robert Leckie we've all been watching in The Pacific) book, None Died in Vain? I ask because the two of you have a similar analysis of the war's prosecution. He's very hard on the Southern slave-owning aristocracy. He uses the term "Slavocracy". I read his book before I knew who he was, so I was actually surprised when I found out he wasn't a black man.
JAMES
Snuffy
Happiness Consultant
You're absolutely correct ... Beauregard and Johnston both Headquartered in the McLean House in First Manassas, and the house was hit by artillery fire during the battle.
The surrender papers were signed in McLean's parlor in Appomattox
Reply...
Hey guys,
Being a history teacher, I'd like to add my two cents here. Regarding J.E.B. Stuart, let's clarify a couple of points...
1) Lee's speech in Gettysburg abashing Stuart is complete fiction. By every historical account I've ever read, the most that was ever said by Lee to Stuart was "General Stuart, you have arrived at last." It's not to say that it doesn't provide good drama...but it's completely false.
2) Stuart and Ewell are frequently the favorite "whipping boys" of the Gettysburg Campaign. With regards to Stuart, this is due to his being out of contact with the Confederate Army.
But to be fair...if you look at Stuart's conduct in previous campaigns, particularly his "Ride around McCellan" (whose conduct I consider to border on treason, but that's a discussion for another time) during the Peninsula Campaign and his successful commanding of infantry and artillery at Chancellorsville after Jackson was wounded, you will see that his conduct was outstanding, and he helped to reshape the role of cavalry.
In some of his other rides around various Union armies, Stuart did ride at a breathless pace, but these were short-duration events, such as riding 100 miles in three days, seventy miles in two days, or one hundred twenty-six miles in three days. However, during the weeks leading up to the Gettysburg Campaign, he was very busy, involved in screening operations in the Blue Ridge Mountains, and then was surprised at Brandy Station, Virginia.
Shortly thereafter, he was ordered to begin following Lee's Army north. The result of this was a long, sustained campaign without sufficient rest. After running into Hancock's Army moving north, Stuart didn't cross the Potomac until June 28th, entering Rockville, Maryland where he came across more than 125 wagon trains which he captured and now had to escort these wagons, along with try and ride around the Union Army. After bumping into Federal cavalry near Hanover, Stuart was forced to perform an all-night march, and it was only on July 1st that Stuart send out scouts to locate Lee's army. Staurt and his cavalry were now on the ragged edge of endurance, having ridden more than two hundred miles in eight days by the time he even got to Gettysburg!
Stuart may have also been suffering not only from a lack of rest, but also from what would later become known as "shell shock," especially after sustained combat operations in the months leading up to Gettysburg. General "Stonewall" Jackson may have suffered this same phenomenon after his sustained efforts in the exemplary Shenandoah Valley campaign in 1862, explaining his rather lackluster performance in the Seven days' campaign outside of Richmond.
I'm not saying that Stuart should be cleaned of any blame for his performance at Gettysburg, but one must also provide a fair picture.
BTW...A movie to watch with a great sound setup is "Midway," especially with a sub-woofer. :d
Hey guys,
Being a history teacher, I'd like to add my two cents here. Regarding J.E.B. Stuart, let's clarify a couple of points...
1) Lee's speech in Gettysburg abashing Stuart is complete fiction. By every historical account I've ever read, the most that was ever said by Lee to Stuart was "General Stuart, you have arrived at last." It's not to say that it doesn't provide good drama...but it's completely false.
2) Stuart and Ewell are frequently the favorite "whipping boys" of the Gettysburg Campaign. With regards to Stuart, this is due to his being out of contact with the Confederate Army.
But to be fair...if you look at Stuart's conduct in previous campaigns, particularly his "Ride around McCellan" (whose conduct I consider to border on treason, but that's a discussion for another time) during the Peninsula Campaign and his successful commanding of infantry and artillery at Chancellorsville after Jackson was wounded, you will see that his conduct was outstanding, and he helped to reshape the role of cavalry.
In some of his other rides around various Union armies, Stuart did ride at a breathless pace, but these were short-duration events, such as riding 100 miles in three days, seventy miles in two days, or one hundred twenty-six miles in three days. However, during the weeks leading up to the Gettysburg Campaign, he was very busy, involved in screening operations in the Blue Ridge Mountains, and then was surprised at Brandy Station, Virginia.
Shortly thereafter, he was ordered to begin following Lee's Army north. The result of this was a long, sustained campaign without sufficient rest. After running into Hancock's Army moving north, Stuart didn't cross the Potomac until June 28th, entering Rockville, Maryland where he came across more than 125 wagon trains which he captured and now had to escort these wagons, along with try and ride around the Union Army. After bumping into Federal cavalry near Hanover, Stuart was forced to perform an all-night march, and it was only on July 1st that Stuart send out scouts to locate Lee's army. Staurt and his cavalry were now on the ragged edge of endurance, having ridden more than two hundred miles in eight days by the time he even got to Gettysburg!
Stuart may have also been suffering not only from a lack of rest, but also from what would later become known as "shell shock," especially after sustained combat operations in the months leading up to Gettysburg. General "Stonewall" Jackson may have suffered this same phenomenon after his sustained efforts in the exemplary Shenandoah Valley campaign in 1862, explaining his rather lackluster performance in the Seven days' campaign outside of Richmond.
I'm not saying that Stuart should be cleaned of any blame for his performance at Gettysburg, but one must also provide a fair picture.
BTW...A movie to watch with a great sound setup is "Midway," especially with a sub-woofer. :d
Ken,
Don't forget about Daniel Sickles, the efforts of Hancock, and the heroics of the 1st Minnesota when you get on the discussion of Day II. It was his unauthorized movement into the Peach Orchard, causing an ungainly bow in the Union lines that may have thrown off the timing of the Confederate attack and worn out the assault before reaching Cemetery Ridge. Because Sickles had come down from the high ground, two Confederate brigades saw virtually nothing between themselves and Cemetery Ridge...and they went for it, thus it was only the heroic sacrifice of the 1st Minnesota and Hancock's quick reactions that prevented a breakthrough.