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The Staff of SOH
Midway Pacific Scenery
- Thread starter Ivan
- Start date
hubbabubba
Charter Member
Yep Ivan,
midway-full-cfs.zip at FlightSim. Just copy/paste in their search engine.
midway-full-cfs.zip at FlightSim. Just copy/paste in their search engine.
Size of Midway
Hello Papingo,
I was curious about flying from Midway because of its SMALL size.
It is hard to believe that so much was expended fighting over such a tiny little bunch of islands.
I was reading a book that pointed out the silliness and lack of worthwhile objectives in this battle that I thought I would go
"experience it firsthand" with some Wildcats and Zeros.
- Ivan.
Hello Papingo,
I was curious about flying from Midway because of its SMALL size.
It is hard to believe that so much was expended fighting over such a tiny little bunch of islands.
I was reading a book that pointed out the silliness and lack of worthwhile objectives in this battle that I thought I would go
"experience it firsthand" with some Wildcats and Zeros.
- Ivan.
hubbabubba
Charter Member
Since the battle was fought, I can't really grasp its "silliness". The IJN committed four of its precious flat top to it. Try to imagine the Midway battle but, this time, with the Japanese in control of the islands.
That would have been a totally different ball game. IMHO...
Hi Hubbabubba,
My point was that as an objective, it was silly. From a strategic point of view, attacking Midway didnt make sense.
Lets say that the Japanese took Midway by invasion with no significant losses and the US only loses the Midway garrison.
What would have changed?
The Japanese could never have sustained operations from Midway because of inability to supply and it wasnt big enough to host a worthwhile air group.
Do you believe different?
- Ivan.
My point was that as an objective, it was silly. From a strategic point of view, attacking Midway didnt make sense.
Lets say that the Japanese took Midway by invasion with no significant losses and the US only loses the Midway garrison.
What would have changed?
The Japanese could never have sustained operations from Midway because of inability to supply and it wasnt big enough to host a worthwhile air group.
Do you believe different?
- Ivan.
let me make it clear from the get go,
i am not a military historian.
i will not pretend to know
the why's and where for's
of strategies and tactics.
my question would be,
if midway was so insignificant,
why then, did the United States want it?
could it be that the location,
midway across the pacific,
was an important stop over
and refueling base for trans pacific flights?
while it may have not been important
as a japanese base of operations,
capturing it would have certainly hindered,
if not ceased, Americain flights across the pacific.
imo, retaining midway would be a top US priority.
crushing the IJN was a lucky break,
perpetuated by hard work, persistence,
and extreme valor on the part of all those
involved in the battle of midway.
it was, obviously, the turning point
of the war in the pacific.
i am not a military historian.
i will not pretend to know
the why's and where for's
of strategies and tactics.
my question would be,
if midway was so insignificant,
why then, did the United States want it?
could it be that the location,
midway across the pacific,
was an important stop over
and refueling base for trans pacific flights?
while it may have not been important
as a japanese base of operations,
capturing it would have certainly hindered,
if not ceased, Americain flights across the pacific.
imo, retaining midway would be a top US priority.
crushing the IJN was a lucky break,
perpetuated by hard work, persistence,
and extreme valor on the part of all those
involved in the battle of midway.
it was, obviously, the turning point
of the war in the pacific.
Midway was Important?
Hello Smilo,
The biggest difference is that the US already owned it and it was pretty much just a forward base that could be supported from Hawaii. The US had the ability to actually use the base.
The Japanese did not hold anything close enough to support it and didn't have the transport capacity to operate effective from it.
The Japanese thought (rightly so) that the US would come out to fight to defend something so close to Hawaii. Their aim was to draw the US forces into THE Great Battle and destroy them.
I am convinced that even if the US had lost ALL the forces committed to defend Midway, it would have made very little difference. The war would have just lasted perhaps a bit longer while assets from other areas were brought into the fight.
Concurrent with this operation, the Japanese were actually able to capture territory in the Aleutians which had about as little meaning as capturing Midway would have. It gave them no advantage other than to annoy the opponent. They risked and lost a lot of resources for no useful gain.
After observing what the Japanese were doing, the Secretary of the Navy and one of his admirals commented:
"The Japanese really have no business fighting a modern war, do they?"
That part was already reasonably obvious from their having started a war they could not possibly win.
- Ivan.
Hello Smilo,
The biggest difference is that the US already owned it and it was pretty much just a forward base that could be supported from Hawaii. The US had the ability to actually use the base.
The Japanese did not hold anything close enough to support it and didn't have the transport capacity to operate effective from it.
The Japanese thought (rightly so) that the US would come out to fight to defend something so close to Hawaii. Their aim was to draw the US forces into THE Great Battle and destroy them.
I am convinced that even if the US had lost ALL the forces committed to defend Midway, it would have made very little difference. The war would have just lasted perhaps a bit longer while assets from other areas were brought into the fight.
Concurrent with this operation, the Japanese were actually able to capture territory in the Aleutians which had about as little meaning as capturing Midway would have. It gave them no advantage other than to annoy the opponent. They risked and lost a lot of resources for no useful gain.
After observing what the Japanese were doing, the Secretary of the Navy and one of his admirals commented:
"The Japanese really have no business fighting a modern war, do they?"
That part was already reasonably obvious from their having started a war they could not possibly win.
- Ivan.
hubbabubba
Charter Member
When it comes to bold statements, Ivan, you don't thread lightly!
While I do agree that the Japanese were doomed from the moment their bombs started falling over Pearl Harbor, I think that the sinking of the last three aircraft carrier - and their escort - would have forced a return to San Diego for what was left of the Pacific Fleet.
Since the end of WWI, Japanese were installed in the Marshall islands as a protectorate, and they had little difficulty commercing with them and maintaining a civil and military presence. These islands are roughly at the same distance from Tokyo than Midway. This was, of course, under peacetime.
The logistic shortcomings of the IJN were to become obvious basically everywhere they planted their flag. How many pictures of emaciated Japaneses, covered with rags, have we seen from Rabaul, Wake, and so on. Even civilians in Japan's proper were on the brink of death by starvation. I don't think that admiral Yamamoto thoughts were; "Let's occupy Midway with a garrison and forget about them."
One of many reasons for such a poor preparation was the efficacy of the unrestricted submarines campaign against Japanese merchant navy. Incidentally, Midway was to be one of the most active U.S. submarine base of WWII.
Actually, the IJN plan was to invade Midway first, then wait for the U.S.N. to commit its precious carriers to retake the atoll. IJN high command worst fear was to see the Americans stay away and wait for the departure of the IJN striking force to pummel the invasion force left behind. Basically, the IJN was making a trap, not knowing that they were themselves about to be in one.
Small maybe, but large enough to park six Grumman TBF-1 Avengers, 19 Douglas SDB Dauntlesses, 7 Grumman F4F-3 Wildcats, 17 Vought SB2U-3 Vindicators, 21 Brewter F2A-3 Buffaloes, 17 B-17 Fortresses and 8 B-26 Marauders, and with enough runways to let them all take-off! I don't think that any carrier, past or present, could "spot" so many.
Add to that number 31 PBY Catalinas and you have a formidable, and unsinkable, aircraft carrier and float-plane tender. Of all the objectives attacked by the combined air groups of the four IJN carriers involved, only Midway received a "full blow" (108 aircraft), and it was judged by the Japanese that a second attack was necessary to "soften-up" the target! The Yorktown was abandoned after two attacks from a single carrier, totaling forty (24 + 16) aircraft, many being shot down before engaging their target.
I really don't think that all that was futile.
Hello Hubbabubba,
You are correct. I do not tread lightly. It isn't in my nature though I should probably learn a bit more diplomacy.
I don't see how the loss of all three US carriers at Midway would have forced anything other than the loss of Midway itself.
Hawaii was totally defendable and not invade-able by the Japanese. The Japanese didn't have the manpower to carry out such an invasion and certainly could not supply Hawaii if by a miracle such an invasion succeeded.
US had done quite a lot of reinforcing in the six months since Pearl Harbor. The Japanese could never achieve air superiority over Hawaii, certainly not with the size of air group they could carry aboard their carriers.
The Line-Up of US Carriers looks about like this as I see it:
CV-1 Langley - Useful for Transport only.
CV-2 Lexington - Sunk at Coral Sea
CV-3 Saratoga - Damaged by repairable
CV-4 Ranger - Atlantic Fleet but totally operational though not as good as other fleet carriers
CV-5 Yorktown - Lost at Midway
CV-6 Enterprise - Presumed Lost at Midway
CV-7 Wasp - Operational
CV-8 Hornet - Presumed Lost at Midway
CV-9 Essex - To be Commissioned at the end of 1942 to be followed by a few susters
CVL-22 Independence Class Cruiser conversions - Available starting early 1943.
So life might be difficult for a time with only Saratoga, Ranger and Wasp, but "USS Oahu" wasn't going away.
One of the major problems with Japanese shipping was that they relied very heavily (about half IIRC) on foreign vessels which became instantly unavailable when the war began.
Another even more severe problem was that it was not just the Imperial Japanese Navy. The Army ran its own shipping and supply and the two did not coordinate. Thus often an Army ship would deliver a cargo and carry ballast home instead of a useful cargo. This rivalry was quite ugly.
An island airfield like Midways SOUNDS nice and imposing as an unsinkable aircraft carrier, but consider the realities:
Yes, they can park a LOT of aircraft. They can carry a LOT of fuel and ordnance.
They rely on water borne transport for all supply unlike a carrier which goes to the supply source.
They have multiple runways because they cannot "Head Into the Wind" for take-off.
They cannot put another 30 Knots of wind to assist aircraft on a short runway.
There are not multiple levels of hangars and aircraft parks so everything is above ground and very hard to hide in an area the size of Midway.
Besides supplies, Aircraft and personnel must all be delivered.
They also cannot vanish into the fog and need to be found again.
The carrier takes a lot less destroying as you know because it IS sinkable and is full of nice combustible stores.
Sometimes it doesn't even take much as the Germans proved with just one torpedo into the HMS Ark Royal.
Maybe I over simplified a bit. A war is seldom easy, but in the next year, the US would have more new carries than all the carriers at the start of the war. The Japanese could not match this capacity even if they had not lost a single ship at Midway.
- Ivan.
You are correct. I do not tread lightly. It isn't in my nature though I should probably learn a bit more diplomacy.
I don't see how the loss of all three US carriers at Midway would have forced anything other than the loss of Midway itself.
Hawaii was totally defendable and not invade-able by the Japanese. The Japanese didn't have the manpower to carry out such an invasion and certainly could not supply Hawaii if by a miracle such an invasion succeeded.
US had done quite a lot of reinforcing in the six months since Pearl Harbor. The Japanese could never achieve air superiority over Hawaii, certainly not with the size of air group they could carry aboard their carriers.
The Line-Up of US Carriers looks about like this as I see it:
CV-1 Langley - Useful for Transport only.
CV-2 Lexington - Sunk at Coral Sea
CV-3 Saratoga - Damaged by repairable
CV-4 Ranger - Atlantic Fleet but totally operational though not as good as other fleet carriers
CV-5 Yorktown - Lost at Midway
CV-6 Enterprise - Presumed Lost at Midway
CV-7 Wasp - Operational
CV-8 Hornet - Presumed Lost at Midway
CV-9 Essex - To be Commissioned at the end of 1942 to be followed by a few susters
CVL-22 Independence Class Cruiser conversions - Available starting early 1943.
So life might be difficult for a time with only Saratoga, Ranger and Wasp, but "USS Oahu" wasn't going away.
One of the major problems with Japanese shipping was that they relied very heavily (about half IIRC) on foreign vessels which became instantly unavailable when the war began.
Another even more severe problem was that it was not just the Imperial Japanese Navy. The Army ran its own shipping and supply and the two did not coordinate. Thus often an Army ship would deliver a cargo and carry ballast home instead of a useful cargo. This rivalry was quite ugly.
An island airfield like Midways SOUNDS nice and imposing as an unsinkable aircraft carrier, but consider the realities:
Yes, they can park a LOT of aircraft. They can carry a LOT of fuel and ordnance.
They rely on water borne transport for all supply unlike a carrier which goes to the supply source.
They have multiple runways because they cannot "Head Into the Wind" for take-off.
They cannot put another 30 Knots of wind to assist aircraft on a short runway.
There are not multiple levels of hangars and aircraft parks so everything is above ground and very hard to hide in an area the size of Midway.
Besides supplies, Aircraft and personnel must all be delivered.
They also cannot vanish into the fog and need to be found again.
The carrier takes a lot less destroying as you know because it IS sinkable and is full of nice combustible stores.
Sometimes it doesn't even take much as the Germans proved with just one torpedo into the HMS Ark Royal.
Maybe I over simplified a bit. A war is seldom easy, but in the next year, the US would have more new carries than all the carriers at the start of the war. The Japanese could not match this capacity even if they had not lost a single ship at Midway.
- Ivan.
Dave Cumming
Charter Member
Been watching a documentary about WW2 and the most recent episode was about Japan from 1937 up to Battle of Midway. The gist of the program was that Japan planned to knock USA out of the war right at the beginning but didn't get the aircraft carriers when they bombed the US fleet on 7 December. They continued to hope that USA would call a truce if it lost the short-term means to fight.
The Solomons campaign was part of their strategy to make it impossible for USA to supply Austrralia. Battle of Coral Sea showed the importance of aircraft carriers as it was the first sea battle where the opposing ships did not sight each other.
Midway may have had the aim of keeping all US bases far away from Japan but US broke their codes and was able to sink their carriers.
Without being any expert I think Japan's problem was they thought that USA would sue for peace after 7 December and then failed in the carrier and submarine war, reducing their mobility. They also didn't have the ability to sustain a prolonged war.
The Solomons campaign was part of their strategy to make it impossible for USA to supply Austrralia. Battle of Coral Sea showed the importance of aircraft carriers as it was the first sea battle where the opposing ships did not sight each other.
Midway may have had the aim of keeping all US bases far away from Japan but US broke their codes and was able to sink their carriers.
Without being any expert I think Japan's problem was they thought that USA would sue for peace after 7 December and then failed in the carrier and submarine war, reducing their mobility. They also didn't have the ability to sustain a prolonged war.
Hello Dave,
Interesting thoughts about the Japanese in general and Midway in particular.
First of all, I don't think anyone here is disputing that the Japanese lost the war as soon as they started it.
They had no hope of winning militarily no matter what strategy they used.
Their actual plans and actions were pretty much devoid of any intelligent strategy and objectives.
Now if WE were the Japanese and were ordered to start a war with an attack on Pearl Harbor, was there a better way to do it?
I say that there most certainly WAS a way to be much more effective though the end result would still be a Japanese defeat:
The attack on Pearl Harbor was relatively poorly executed. The objectives were too limited.
The major destruction was to tactical assets on Oahu. Aircraft and Ships were destroyed.
The actual number of personnel killed was relatively low if the casualties of the USS Arizona were taken out.
The target should have been whatever it took to eliminate Oahu and Hawaii as a sustainable base of operations.
There were two critical assets that were not significantly damaged that would have made a serious difference.
Hawaii does not refine its own oil. All fuel that is used is shipped in. Tank farms should have been a target but were undamaged.
The Navy Yard that would be used for repair work was not damaged significantly. If it were, the ability to patch up ships for the voyage back to the continent for permanent repairs would have been greatly reduced.
There SHOULD have been a Third Wave at a minimum and possibly even a Fourth Wave. The element of surprise was no longer there, but this was the only time they would EVER have air superiority over Hawaii.
Could they have done significantly more damage with the weapons available on a Carrier? I don't know, but it did not appear they even tried.
Would they have lost more aircraft in multiple strikes or a prolonged battle? Certainly.
Would it have reduced capability for future operations? Absolutely, but this was the best chance they had.
The Japanese plans for war counted too much on being able to predict their enemies' actions. They did not have much room for the unexpected.
Agreed:
Japanese submarine and ASW were notably poor throughout the war. This is quite embarrassing for an island nation.
These ideas are not mine, but they are so old I forgot where or when I originally encountered them.
- Ivan.
Interesting thoughts about the Japanese in general and Midway in particular.
First of all, I don't think anyone here is disputing that the Japanese lost the war as soon as they started it.
They had no hope of winning militarily no matter what strategy they used.
Their actual plans and actions were pretty much devoid of any intelligent strategy and objectives.
Now if WE were the Japanese and were ordered to start a war with an attack on Pearl Harbor, was there a better way to do it?
I say that there most certainly WAS a way to be much more effective though the end result would still be a Japanese defeat:
The attack on Pearl Harbor was relatively poorly executed. The objectives were too limited.
The major destruction was to tactical assets on Oahu. Aircraft and Ships were destroyed.
The actual number of personnel killed was relatively low if the casualties of the USS Arizona were taken out.
The target should have been whatever it took to eliminate Oahu and Hawaii as a sustainable base of operations.
There were two critical assets that were not significantly damaged that would have made a serious difference.
Hawaii does not refine its own oil. All fuel that is used is shipped in. Tank farms should have been a target but were undamaged.
The Navy Yard that would be used for repair work was not damaged significantly. If it were, the ability to patch up ships for the voyage back to the continent for permanent repairs would have been greatly reduced.
There SHOULD have been a Third Wave at a minimum and possibly even a Fourth Wave. The element of surprise was no longer there, but this was the only time they would EVER have air superiority over Hawaii.
Could they have done significantly more damage with the weapons available on a Carrier? I don't know, but it did not appear they even tried.
Would they have lost more aircraft in multiple strikes or a prolonged battle? Certainly.
Would it have reduced capability for future operations? Absolutely, but this was the best chance they had.
The Japanese plans for war counted too much on being able to predict their enemies' actions. They did not have much room for the unexpected.
Agreed:
Japanese submarine and ASW were notably poor throughout the war. This is quite embarrassing for an island nation.
These ideas are not mine, but they are so old I forgot where or when I originally encountered them.
- Ivan.
Dave Cumming
Charter Member
Ivan
Japan appears to have banked on the assumption that the USA would react as they expected. History is full of similar mistakes.
I take the points about the oil tank and repair facilities. I wonder if Japan even thought of invading Oahu and the other islands. That would have removed Hawaii as a staging post for US, but I don't know if Japan had ther naval forces to continue to hold them.
No new mission to upload today but I am close to writing one with lots of random aircraft to encounter on patrol. Yesterday PM and this morning was spent trying different things out.
I have not been able to find out what the CAP marker does at the end of a waypoint line. I thought it was to tell CFS that it may have to drop out of Warp if it met enemy object but this doesn't happen.
The only way to have a warped plane meet enemy is to have the enemy within 12km of the Warp point. 9 minutes of longtitude works (enemy appears at a range of 11800yds) but 10min of latitude is too far away. If youir enemy is not at a warp point you will have to disable warping so the plane flies through the contested airspace until it meets the enemy.
For aircraft formations, the planes seem to like being at least 250yds apart; 200yd separation in 2 planes (200yd sidways and 200yds vertical) will also work. Any nearer and you get great risk of collision.
Japan appears to have banked on the assumption that the USA would react as they expected. History is full of similar mistakes.
I take the points about the oil tank and repair facilities. I wonder if Japan even thought of invading Oahu and the other islands. That would have removed Hawaii as a staging post for US, but I don't know if Japan had ther naval forces to continue to hold them.
No new mission to upload today but I am close to writing one with lots of random aircraft to encounter on patrol. Yesterday PM and this morning was spent trying different things out.
I have not been able to find out what the CAP marker does at the end of a waypoint line. I thought it was to tell CFS that it may have to drop out of Warp if it met enemy object but this doesn't happen.
The only way to have a warped plane meet enemy is to have the enemy within 12km of the Warp point. 9 minutes of longtitude works (enemy appears at a range of 11800yds) but 10min of latitude is too far away. If youir enemy is not at a warp point you will have to disable warping so the plane flies through the contested airspace until it meets the enemy.
For aircraft formations, the planes seem to like being at least 250yds apart; 200yd separation in 2 planes (200yd sidways and 200yds vertical) will also work. Any nearer and you get great risk of collision.
Hawaii Invasion
Hello Dave,
Don't know about relationship to any missions. Didn't know you were working on Midway Missions.
See earlier posts on invasion of Hawaii.
As a summary, even if the Japanese WERE able to successfully invade Hawaii, there was no hope that they would be able to supply their own forces out that far and certainly could not sustain the existing civilian population already living there.
It could have gotten interesting if they actually had destroyed the fuel reserves on Hawaiian Islands and then prevented a resupply by blockading the island with submarines.
The fight would get a whole lot uglier for the Americans if the Japanese had done that.
- Ivan.
Hello Dave,
Don't know about relationship to any missions. Didn't know you were working on Midway Missions.
See earlier posts on invasion of Hawaii.
As a summary, even if the Japanese WERE able to successfully invade Hawaii, there was no hope that they would be able to supply their own forces out that far and certainly could not sustain the existing civilian population already living there.
It could have gotten interesting if they actually had destroyed the fuel reserves on Hawaiian Islands and then prevented a resupply by blockading the island with submarines.
The fight would get a whole lot uglier for the Americans if the Japanese had done that.
- Ivan.