I don’t know if I would put it quite that way.
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It’s been a few years since I’ve read on the subject of “fighter escort doctrine in the ETO in WW-II”, but I seem to remember there was some difference of opinion as to what tactic was more effective. The “common sense” approach, and that used when the campaign started, was to stick close to the bombers. At some point, somebody(s) decided that a more effective tactic would be to “turn the fighters loose” to actively pursue enemy VF. I’m not up to speed on what the current thinking is among historians today as to which “faction” was correct, but the last time I read on this, the consensus seemed to be that tying the escort fighters to the bombers was “inefficient”. Thinking about it now, I suppose it was “inefficient” in terms of racking up kills to paint on the side of your P-51, and I can see how such tactics could be viewed by bombers crews as “deserting the bombers to go 109 hunting." So what was "doctrine", and did it "evolve" from 1942 to 1945?
Paul,
You are correct in what you say. Doctrine for the allies in the ETO did undergo a fundamental shift, which the 332nd FG deliberately chose to ignore. They did not do this to undermine the underlying strategy. They did it because Benjamin O. Davis quite rightly deduced that in the case of the 332nd FG any bomber losses would be used as an excuse to declare "the experiment" a failure, fold the unit, enlist the airmen, and set back the advancement of civil rights in America a full generation.
The doctrine was changed shortly after Jimmy Doolittle arrived on scene and rightly deduced that the bombers could serve two strategic roles. First, they could continue to bomb German production and transportation facilities. But second, they could be used as bait to draw the Luftwaffe fighter arm from every other theater in the war, and the allies could adopt tactics for their fighter units to destroy those fighters. Combined with what damage the bombers' gunners could inflict directly, such a policy would bleed the Luftwaffe fighter arm white.
It worked! Spectacularly!
The tactic of loose escort was therefore adopted. Fighters would be assigned dual purpose roles. They would escort bombers to the target while laden with bombs and flying slow. Then after bombs release they would detach and go down low and engage targets of opportunity. These often included Luftwaffe airbases. It was also during this time that the ETO changed policy on confirmed kills and decided that an aircraft destroyed on the ground would count as an aerial victory. It was a brilliant decision that encouraged pilots to engage in the very dangerous attacks of said airbases.
This tactic also encouraged deliberate air taskings to allied fighter units to loiter near Luftwaffe bases timed to coincide with an expected scramble to form up and attack a known bomber raid. Then these allied fighters would butcher the fighters while taking off. Other taskings put allied fighters overhead the bases timed to coincide with Luftwaffe fighers that returned from attacking the bombers.
We had plenty of fighters and pilots to devote to these parallel missions.
The effect was dramatic. Luftwaffe fighter loses exploded. As a result the Luftwaffe had to drain fighters from the Eastern Front, which is the primary reason why the Germans lost air superiority over this front, and why the IL-2 Sturmovik became the lengendary ground attack aircraft it became.
This is why in my initial post on this issue I put a caveat in my writings that admitted perhaps the Tuskegee Airmen's tactic wasn't the best decision all other factors being equal. Unfortunately for them, they weren't operating in an equal environment. Therefore, Davis' order made solid sense. Regardless, the bomber crews most certainly benefitted from it directly.
Ken
