Curtis P40
Charter Member
" I owe Harry Truman my life." Capt. W.S. Griffin, Helldiver pilot. Bombing Squadron 19, U.S.S. Lexington. He was there, I wasn't.
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The Staff of SOH
Today is....
- Thread starter kilo delta
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Ghostrider
Charter Member 2012
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]To me, the debate is not about whether or not the Atomic attacks were horrific - they were - I hope such weapons will never be used again. The debate is about two choices - to use the bombs or not to use them. It was simply a choice between the lesser of two evils for all concerned. Suggesting that Japan was just about to give up anyway is extrememly naive. Do some reading about Okinawa, and the Pacific war in general. How many lives (American and Japanese) were lost invading tiny little flyspeck islands in the Pacific? The revered soil of mainland Japan itself? The Emporer's holy palace and person? Read about the preparations Japan was making to defend the home islands. Postwar and WWII Japanese mentalities are NOT the same. Japanese culture has changed dramatically regarding warfare and militarism in the last 65 years. An aggressive class of military officers no longer rules Japan, and sets the tone and direction of their foreign policy.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif][/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]"By late July 1945, Japan was strategically defeated. The Imperial Navy would never again sail to threaten U.S. ships; the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere had shrunk to a small oval enclosing the Home Islands, Korea and parts of China.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Japan's ultimate defeat was certain. Never the less, it still retained significant capability to wage war and to wreak havoc on the populations and prisoners of war remaining under its control. Waiting for Japan to implode and risking the death throes of the defeated enemy was not an option.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]On the 50th University of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, many historians debated the necessity of the atomic bombings. Japan, they suggested, could never have held out. If an invasion had been necessary, the Japanese would not have been formidable adversaries, and in any event, if the allies had merely offered to allow Emperor Hirohito to remain on his throne, Japan would have surrendered.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]I thought differently then, and, five years later with then help of a newly released CIA intelligence report I am even more thoroughly convinced. [/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]It was imperative to end the Pacific war as soon as possible. American POW' were suffering appallingly; the civilian captives in Singapore and Hong Kong were in desperate straits. It seemed at least probable that many of them would be murdered within weeks as their captors sought to divert food and troops from the camps to military uses. Finally, the end of the war would mean an end to both American and Japanese casualties. The lessons of Okinawa and Iwo Jima remained fresh.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]In the last five years, answers have emerged to the critical question surrounding the decision to drop the A-bomb: "What did President Truman know about the Japanese strength and when did he learn it?" President Truman knew a great deal, and none of it pointed to a speedy end of the conflict without the bomb or a battle for the Japanese homeland at awful cost. One hundred thousand Japanese defenders on Okinawa cost 48,000 US casualties, half the Japanese on Iwo Jima died.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]A year ago the CIAs Center for the Study of Intelligence released intelligence reports gathered in the final months of the war, new information that should decisively shut the debate.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]A note in Truman's own handwriting says that Gen. George C. Marshall's estimate of US casualties was about a quarter-million killed, wounded and missing. The actual estimate by the Joint War Plans Committee was 220,000 as of early June-close enough. However, we now know that this figure was based on a near-catastrophic underestimate of Japanese troop strength.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]In May, US Intelligence estimated that Kyushu was the base for 246,000 Japanese, of whom 128,000 were in Army ground force units. Projecting forward to Nov. 1, the scheduled date for Operation Olympic, military analysts estimated that Japan could reinforce the island with 100,000 more soldiers for a total of about 350,000 troops.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]But by June 16, Kyushu was already home to more Japanese divisions than had been considered the maximum number possible in November. In mid-July, US Intelligence turned up three more divisions on the island`, and by the end of the month yet another appeared, bringing the total to 12, including 10 combat divisions.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]A week later, on August12, Japanese strength on Kyushu had soared to 579,000. General Charles Willoughby, Mac Arthur's intelligence chief, said of Japanese reinforcements, "the end is not in sight." Since the planned invasion force numbered 770,000 including the crews of the naval vessels supporting the landing, Willoughby suggested that the Americans and Japanese armies might have equal strength-not he said, "A recipe for victory." [/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Two days before Hiroshima, Japanese forces in Kyushu reached 600,000. Nine divisions faced the invasion beaches in the south, three times the force projected when Operation Olympic was planned. President Truman may not have known the final figures when he released the atomic weapons to the Air Force, but he and his closest advisors knew the magnitude of the forces arrayed against us.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]The ability to move 360,000 troops to Kyushu between May and August demonstrated that Japan retained both the will and the ability to continue the war for months to come. Not only was the force in place but also so were the logistics and supplies to sustain it in the field against and invading army. [/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]The cost of an invasion to both sides would have been horrendous. Japanese troops on Iwo Jima and Okinawa died rather than surrender; who can doubt that the defense of Japan itself would have been equally ferocious? [/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]We may never know if a continuation of conventional bombing and the naval blockade of Japanese ports would have brought capitulation without invasion. Perhaps it would have, but many Japanese lives would have been lost in the bombing. And the postwar world have been very different. The Soviet Army invaded Korea on Aug. 7 and in a few weeks might conquered enough territory to demand a place at the peace table. Even after Japan surrendered, Stalin demanded partition of the country at the same 38th parallel that split Korea; with his troops on the ground it would have been impossible to say "no." [/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki served three purposes: it terminated the conflict instantly, saving countless American and Japanese lives, it insured a united Japan rather than leaving half of the country to the same fate as North Korea; and perhaps it provided an example which has deterred the use of nuclear arms for 55 years. [/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]All writers on this subject have biases, and all view the end of the war through spectacles they have worn for many years. It is only fair to state my own: My father was a US Naval officer in command of a Seabee unit slated for Operation Olympic. He didn't have to go.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]But the objective evidence now available demonstrates simply that the sacrifice of Hiroshima (from where Admiral Yamamoto on his flagship Nagato commanded the attack on Pearl harbor), and of Nagasaki as well, was preferable to the likely alternatives." - Peter D. Zimmerman[/FONT]
Bottom line: the Japanese were NOT going to go quietly, short of an order from the Emporer himself to surrender. The atomic attacks finally convinced him to do just that. Yes, there were elements in the Japanese who advocated surrender, but they were in the minority, and were being assasinated by their more aggressive colleauges.
On another note, I have always found it interesting that Hirohito was allowed to maintain his position as Emporer. It's sort of like letting Tojo or Hitler stay in power.
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif][/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]"By late July 1945, Japan was strategically defeated. The Imperial Navy would never again sail to threaten U.S. ships; the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere had shrunk to a small oval enclosing the Home Islands, Korea and parts of China.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Japan's ultimate defeat was certain. Never the less, it still retained significant capability to wage war and to wreak havoc on the populations and prisoners of war remaining under its control. Waiting for Japan to implode and risking the death throes of the defeated enemy was not an option.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]On the 50th University of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, many historians debated the necessity of the atomic bombings. Japan, they suggested, could never have held out. If an invasion had been necessary, the Japanese would not have been formidable adversaries, and in any event, if the allies had merely offered to allow Emperor Hirohito to remain on his throne, Japan would have surrendered.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]I thought differently then, and, five years later with then help of a newly released CIA intelligence report I am even more thoroughly convinced. [/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]It was imperative to end the Pacific war as soon as possible. American POW' were suffering appallingly; the civilian captives in Singapore and Hong Kong were in desperate straits. It seemed at least probable that many of them would be murdered within weeks as their captors sought to divert food and troops from the camps to military uses. Finally, the end of the war would mean an end to both American and Japanese casualties. The lessons of Okinawa and Iwo Jima remained fresh.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]In the last five years, answers have emerged to the critical question surrounding the decision to drop the A-bomb: "What did President Truman know about the Japanese strength and when did he learn it?" President Truman knew a great deal, and none of it pointed to a speedy end of the conflict without the bomb or a battle for the Japanese homeland at awful cost. One hundred thousand Japanese defenders on Okinawa cost 48,000 US casualties, half the Japanese on Iwo Jima died.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]A year ago the CIAs Center for the Study of Intelligence released intelligence reports gathered in the final months of the war, new information that should decisively shut the debate.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]A note in Truman's own handwriting says that Gen. George C. Marshall's estimate of US casualties was about a quarter-million killed, wounded and missing. The actual estimate by the Joint War Plans Committee was 220,000 as of early June-close enough. However, we now know that this figure was based on a near-catastrophic underestimate of Japanese troop strength.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]In May, US Intelligence estimated that Kyushu was the base for 246,000 Japanese, of whom 128,000 were in Army ground force units. Projecting forward to Nov. 1, the scheduled date for Operation Olympic, military analysts estimated that Japan could reinforce the island with 100,000 more soldiers for a total of about 350,000 troops.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]But by June 16, Kyushu was already home to more Japanese divisions than had been considered the maximum number possible in November. In mid-July, US Intelligence turned up three more divisions on the island`, and by the end of the month yet another appeared, bringing the total to 12, including 10 combat divisions.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]A week later, on August12, Japanese strength on Kyushu had soared to 579,000. General Charles Willoughby, Mac Arthur's intelligence chief, said of Japanese reinforcements, "the end is not in sight." Since the planned invasion force numbered 770,000 including the crews of the naval vessels supporting the landing, Willoughby suggested that the Americans and Japanese armies might have equal strength-not he said, "A recipe for victory." [/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Two days before Hiroshima, Japanese forces in Kyushu reached 600,000. Nine divisions faced the invasion beaches in the south, three times the force projected when Operation Olympic was planned. President Truman may not have known the final figures when he released the atomic weapons to the Air Force, but he and his closest advisors knew the magnitude of the forces arrayed against us.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]The ability to move 360,000 troops to Kyushu between May and August demonstrated that Japan retained both the will and the ability to continue the war for months to come. Not only was the force in place but also so were the logistics and supplies to sustain it in the field against and invading army. [/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]The cost of an invasion to both sides would have been horrendous. Japanese troops on Iwo Jima and Okinawa died rather than surrender; who can doubt that the defense of Japan itself would have been equally ferocious? [/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]We may never know if a continuation of conventional bombing and the naval blockade of Japanese ports would have brought capitulation without invasion. Perhaps it would have, but many Japanese lives would have been lost in the bombing. And the postwar world have been very different. The Soviet Army invaded Korea on Aug. 7 and in a few weeks might conquered enough territory to demand a place at the peace table. Even after Japan surrendered, Stalin demanded partition of the country at the same 38th parallel that split Korea; with his troops on the ground it would have been impossible to say "no." [/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki served three purposes: it terminated the conflict instantly, saving countless American and Japanese lives, it insured a united Japan rather than leaving half of the country to the same fate as North Korea; and perhaps it provided an example which has deterred the use of nuclear arms for 55 years. [/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]All writers on this subject have biases, and all view the end of the war through spectacles they have worn for many years. It is only fair to state my own: My father was a US Naval officer in command of a Seabee unit slated for Operation Olympic. He didn't have to go.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]But the objective evidence now available demonstrates simply that the sacrifice of Hiroshima (from where Admiral Yamamoto on his flagship Nagato commanded the attack on Pearl harbor), and of Nagasaki as well, was preferable to the likely alternatives." - Peter D. Zimmerman[/FONT]
Bottom line: the Japanese were NOT going to go quietly, short of an order from the Emporer himself to surrender. The atomic attacks finally convinced him to do just that. Yes, there were elements in the Japanese who advocated surrender, but they were in the minority, and were being assasinated by their more aggressive colleauges.
On another note, I have always found it interesting that Hirohito was allowed to maintain his position as Emporer. It's sort of like letting Tojo or Hitler stay in power.
Navy Chief
Senior Member
I went to the "Peace" museum in Hiroshima, when I was TAD at MCAS Iwakuni, Japan, in the late 90s.
There is very little mention of the attack on Pearl Harbor in the museum displays, period. They do not discuss their involvement in the war at all. The overall theme of the museum is that nuclear bombs are bad, and should never be used.
I maintain it was necessary at the time to save American lives. And it did just that.
NC
There is very little mention of the attack on Pearl Harbor in the museum displays, period. They do not discuss their involvement in the war at all. The overall theme of the museum is that nuclear bombs are bad, and should never be used.
I maintain it was necessary at the time to save American lives. And it did just that.
NC
ndicki
Charter Member 2016
Not just American lives. Do not forget that although the media tend to focus on the "sexy" island-hopping campaigns, there were hundreds of thousands of Empire troops, airmen and seamen fighting the Japanese. My father was earmarked for Tiger Force - Bomber Command's contribution to the bombing of Japan - and was released as a result of their early surrender.
Just thought you needed reminding - it wasn't an Americans-only war.
Just thought you needed reminding - it wasn't an Americans-only war.
brad kaste
Charter Member
Ghostrider,....actually it was important that Hirohito maintain his emperor's position. It added great stability within the military and civil population. General MacArthur was able to bring many democratic changes within the Japanese government during the post war years. From allowing the organization of unions to the Japanese woman's the right to vote.
Hirohito would like to be thought of a benign, kindly gran'fatherly gent who waded around in the tide pools of Tokyo Bay looking for marine creatures. Which he was good at. However, during the war years he was very cognizant of what was going on in the war and had given approval on such matters.
Ghostrider
Charter Member 2012
Yeah Brad, I know that was the argument for letting him stay, and I understand its merits. Who am I to second-guess, and look at the results - Japan is now a stable, reliable democracy, and a pretty good ally in the region. We've been on pretty good terms since 1945 for enemies who were once so bitter. But, as you said, Hirohito was very much "in the loop" as far as the war's planning and conduct. I'm just saying it's interesting that he was allowed to stay. Maybe having "Tojo" as the 'fall guy' and the whole 'deity' thing ultimately saved the Emporer's skin.
I also find it interesting how modern-day Japan has sort of a revisionist slant to its history during the war years. No, I don't think they talk alot about Pearl Harbor, Nanking, Bataan, etc. in their history classes. I understand on the one hand that they want to get away from that part of their history, and that it would be a source of shame today, but it seems to have been almost a pendulum swing to a "never happened" mentality, and a reluctance to apologize as a government to anyone for at least some of their more brutal acts. Not pointing fingers, I know the US, especially in our slave holding, "imperialist" and "expansionist" days, was far from blameless. This is the stuff of human history, expansion, colonization, etc. Not a pretty picture most of the time. Just very interesting. And I think Japan and Germany were the last nations to really try large-scale, aggressive military conquest to expand their spheres of influence, and it wasn't so long ago. It is still in our collective consciousness and memory, as a human race. I think it's important to remember, so we don't go down those same roads again. With today's nuclear arsenals, we can't afford to.