(...)
The Arado 196 is a strange one. The issues you are bringing up seem to mostly involve the engine which was a fairly proven design. The BMW 132 was also used in the FW 200 and the DORNIER 17.... One of the photographs I saw of the battle damage on board Admiral Graf Spee showed the remains of a burnt out seaplane which would suggest that the Arado was aboard during the battle.
(...)
- Ivan.
The carcass of the Arado Ar 196A-1 was effectively still standing on the catapult of the Graf Spee in Montevideo as these pictures show;
View attachment 26579This one, depicting damages amidship, shows clearly that the engine and the wings of the aircraft are missing;
View attachment 26580This one, from the stern perspective, shows the floats still attached;
but the best view is this one;
View attachment 26581
We can observe that the engine and the wings are "neatly" missing, they haven't been torn away by the blast of an explosion or burn by fire, like the tail fuselage would suggest. Otherwise, we should see the charred remains of spars, the distorted engine's supports. Between the time a
Graf Spee lookout signaled the masts of a warship (0530 hours) to the first Exeter salvo (0620 hours), the Ar 196 could have been catapulted half-a-dozen times... if it was airworthy. The book I cited above was clearly referring to the log book of the
Graf Spee. Another document, to be found
HERE , is also referring to the log book and gives the same date for the aircraft demise. I can only but speculate here. Since the last flight of the Ar 196 and the beginning of the battle, less than 48 hours had gone by. It is more than probable that the salvaging of all useful items was interrupted by more urging affairs. Again, concerning the BMW 132, we are left with hypothesis; was the engine fuel injected like other Luftwaffe BMW 132 engines, and contrary to carburettor-fed "civilian" aircraft, causing overheating or abnormal cylinder pressure? Was the engine too stiff, or too loose, in its cradle? Was the cowling causing bad airflow around the engine? I see no reason to reject log book entries, and no good reasons to believe that the Ar 196 was left on its catapult while its services were so much needed.
The Battle of River Plate.
Aftermath:
HMS Exeter: All guns unserviceable. She has suffered severe damage but is hardly a pontoon. She sails for the Falklands under her own power.
HMS Achilles: No Significant Damage.
HMS Ajax: Both Aft Turrets unserviceable. One gun in a Forward Turret disabled.
DKM Admiral Graf Spee: One 5.9 inch gun disabled. All Range Finders disabled. Oil Purifier destroyed. Desalination plant destroyed (Apparently this was also required for operation of the diesels. I am not sure what the purpose of clean water was. Perhaps it was for coolant, perhaps it was for anti-detonant or for cylinder cleaning.) The Desalination plant apparently was the most critical loss and reports sent to Germany were only revealed in 2000.
Most of AGS's main armament ammunition was expended. In the prior battle, her secondaries landed absolutely ZERO hits on any of her opponents.
The ship that replaced HMS Exeter was a County class Cruiser: HMS Cumberland. Cumberland was a ship that was nearly identical in dimensions to Graf Spee (20 feet longer but 3 feet less beam). The German 28 cm gun threw a 660 pound shell. The British 8 inch gun threw a 256 pound shell. The British gun had about twice the theoretical firing rate, but for practical purposes, the firing rates were close to identical. Not that it was important (because either ship's main armament would have blasted through its opponent), but except for the conning tower and turret faces, the armour was fairly similar with belt thickness going to Cumberland.
If both ships were healthy and fighting one on one, Graf Spee should win but not without sustaining crippling damage. As the fight stood with two other hulls, I can't see Graf Spee surviving such a fight. Should couldn't even target all of her opponents at the same time. There would always be one opponent unengaged.
- Ivan.
The
Exeter had lost all its main guns, was without communication, without gyro-compass, without main mast, was listing 11° and crawled to the Faklands at half speed, steered below aft deck and navigating with a boat's compass. Okay, she was not a pontoon. Maybe a barge?
The Achilles was almost unscathed, but very low on ammo, as she had been shooting broadside after broadside. With only three main guns left, the Ajax was involuntarily forced into a saving mode.
The damage on the
Graf Spee were not so apparent. The range finding theodolites were still functional. Otherwise, how could we explain that she straddled the
Achilles at 11.5 nautical miles on her second salvo at 1015 hours, long after she had received her last shell impact? She still had, according to numerous sources, all of its main gun and enough ammunition for 40 minutes of continual firing.
The main problem was the oil-fuel treatment plant. Here is the best description of the system I have found so far;
The ‘Deutschland’ Class armoured ships, to which Admiral Graf Spee belonged, were diesel-propelled. The diesel fuel oil available for marine use in those days was much “heavier,” i.e., viscous, than today’s more highly refined product. Accordingly, it needed to be pre-heated to achieve proper combustion when burned in diesel engines. About 24 hours’ supply of heated fuel oil was therefore kept in a ‘day tank’ for immediate supply to the engines. In the ‘Deutschland’ Class armoured ships the day tank was heated by internal steam coils, steam being supplied from a donkey boiler by way of an unprotected
line running along the upper deck. This critical design flaw now manifested itself: a 6 inch hit on Admiral Graf Spee’s upper deck amidships had severed the steam supply line from the donkey boiler to the day tank. There would be no more pre-heated fuel available for main engines once the oil in the day
tank had been exhausted. And without preheated fuel, the engines would rapidly carbon up and eventually stop running altogether — especially in the cold waters of the North Atlantic which would be encountered on the return to Germany.
The PDF can be found
HERE , and the system description was explained to the author by seasoned RCN-RN naval engineers specialized in diesel propulsion.
I do agree with you that the Graf Spee was doomed after entering Montevideo harbor. What puzzle me was why Langsdorff didn't went instead to Buenos Aires, well within reach. Night was falling and he only had to take the Rio de la Plata (which, btw, means Silver River, not "plate" river) dragged channel to get there. During its sojourn in Montevideo, all the help came from Buenos Aires anyway, as pro-British and pro-French harbor facility providers were not cooperating.
Most of Langsdorff decisions were based on sketchy, when not faulty, information. He attacked the
Exeter thinking she was alone with two destroyers escorting a convoy. Once having dealt with the
Exeter, he did not pursue his advantage on the light cruisers, thinking that a larger force was beyond the horizon. He found refuge in a neutral port knowingly pro-British while another neutral port, Buenos Aires, knowingly pro-German, was within reach on the pretense that he would have to fight in shallow waters. He then left Montevideo and scuttled the
Graf Spee,
in shallow waters, thinking the
Ark Royal and the
Renown were waiting for him.
How many of these decisions would have been different if the Ar 196 had been patrolling?
